



The Initial Impact of the Crisis on
Emerging Market Countries
ABSTRACT To understand the diverse impact of the crisis across emerging
market countries, we explore the role of two shocks—the collapse in trade and
the sharp decline in ﬁnancial ﬂows—in the transmission of the crisis from the
advanced economies. We ﬁrst develop a simple open economy model, which
allows for imperfect capital mobility and potentially contractionary effects of
currency depreciation due to foreign debt exposure. We then look at the cross-
country evidence. The data suggest a strong role for both trade and ﬁnancial
shocks. Perhaps surprisingly, the data give little econometric support for a cen-
tral role of either reserves or exchange rate regimes. We end by presenting case
studies for Latvia, Russia, and Chile.
O
ne of the striking characteristics of the ﬁnancial crisis that originated
in the United States is how quickly and how broadly it spread to the
rest of the world. When the crisis intensiﬁed, ﬁrst in the United States and
then in Europe, in the fall of 2008, emerging market countries thought they
might escape more or less unharmed. There was talk of decoupling. This
was not to be.
Figure 1 shows growth rates of GDP for a group of advanced economies
and a group of emerging market countries from the ﬁrst quarter of 2006
through 2009. The two series have moved largely in tandem. In the fourth
quarter of 2008 and the ﬁrst quarter of 2009, economic growth in the
advanced group averaged −7.2 percent and −8.3 percent, respectively (at
annual rates). In the same two quarters, growth in the emerging market
countries was −1.9 percent and −3.2 percent, respectively. As the ﬁgure
shows, the better numbers for the emerging market countries reﬂect their
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1. The countries and their abbreviations are as follows: Argentina (ARG), Brazil (BRA),
Chile (CHL), China (CHN), Colombia (COL), Croatia (HRV), Czech Republic (CZE), Esto-
nia (EST), Hungary (HUN), India (IND), Indonesia (IDN), Israel (ISR), Republic of Korea
(KOR), Latvia (LVA), Lithuania (LTU), Malaysia (MYS), Mexico (MEX), Peru (PER),
Poland (POL), Philippines (PHL), Russia (RUS), Republic of Serbia (SER), Slovak Republic
(SVK), Slovenia (SVN), South Africa (ZAF), Taiwan Province of China (TWN), Thailand
(THA), Turkey (TUR), and Venezuela (VEN). In ﬁgure 1, the series for emerging market
countries includes Bulgaria, Pakistan, Romania, and Ukraine (not in our sample) but excludes
HRV, CZE, ISR, SER, SVK, SVN, and TWN. Some of the emerging market countries listed
here are classiﬁed as “advanced economies” in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook.
Figure 1. Growth in GDP in Advanced and Emerging Market Economies, 2006–09
Percent per yeara
Sources: IMF, Global Data Source, and IMF staff estimates.
a. Quarter over quarter at an annual rate. Series are averages weighted by GDP at purchasing power parity
(PPP). 
b. The figure is based on 17 advanced economies (including the euro area as a single economy) and 25 emerging 









higher underlying average growth rate. Growth rates for both groups
during those two quarters were roughly 10 percentage points below their
2007 value.
The parallel performance of the two groups in ﬁgure 1 hides substantial
heterogeneity within each group. Figure 2 shows, for a sample of 29 emerg-
ing market countries, the actual growth rate for the semester composed of
the two quarters with large negative growth, 2008Q4 and 2009Q1, minus
the April 2008 International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecast growth rate
over the corresponding period—“unexpected growth” in what follows.
1
All the countries in the sample had negative unexpected growth, but with
12178-05a_Blanchard_rev1.qxd  8/11/10  12:16 PM  Page 264considerable variation across them. In seven countries, including some as
diverse as Latvia and Turkey, growth was lower than forecast by more
than 20 percentage points (again at an annual rate); at the same time, in
five countries, China and India most notable among them, the unexpected
growth shortfall was smaller than 5 percentage points. (Looking at growth
rates themselves, or at deviations of growth rates from trend, gives a very
similar ordering.)
Figure 2 motivates the question we take up in this paper, namely,
whether one can explain the diverse pattern of growth across emerging mar-
ket countries during the crisis. The larger goal is an obvious one: to better
understand the role and the nature of trade and ﬁnancial channels in the
transmission of shocks in the global economy.
We focus on emerging market countries. We leave out low-income
countries, not on the basis of their economic characteristics, but because
they typically lack the quarterly data we think are needed for an informed
analysis of the impact effects of the crisis. We focus only on the acute phase
of the crisis, namely, 2008Q4 and 2009Q1. Looking at later quarters, which
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Figure 2. Unexpected Growth in GDP in Emerging Market Countries, 2008Q3–2009Q1
Percent per yeara
Sources: IMF, Global Data Source and World Economic Outlook; Eurostat.
a. Actual growth in GDP over the two quarters 2008Q4 and 2009Q1, seasonally adjusted at an annual rate, 



































































































































































































































12178-05a_Blanchard_rev1.qxd  8/11/10  12:16 PM  Page 265in most countries are characterized by positive growth and recovery,
would be useful, including for understanding what happened in the acute
phase. But for reasons of data and scope, we leave this to further research.
2
We start in section I by presenting a simple model. It is clear that emerg-
ing market countries were affected primarily by external shocks, mainly
through two channels. The ﬁrst was a sharp decrease in their exports and,
in the case of commodity producers, a sharp drop in their terms of trade.
The second was a sharp decrease in net capital flows. Countries were
exposed in various ways: some were very open to trade, others not; some
had large short-term external debts or large current account deﬁcits, or both,
others not; some had large foreign currency debts, others not. They also
reacted in different ways, most relying on some ﬁscal expansion and some
monetary easing, some using reserves to maintain the exchange rate, others
instead letting it adjust. The model we provide is little more than a place-
holder, but it offers a useful framework for discussing the various channels
and the potential role of policy, and for organizing the empirical work.
We then turn to the empirical evidence, which we analyze through
econometrics, in section II, as well as case studies. We start with simple
cross-country speciﬁcations, linking unexpected growth over the two quar-
ters to various trade and ﬁnancial variables. With at most 29 observations
in each regression, econometrics can tell us only so much. But the role
of both channels, trade and ﬁnancial, comes out clearly. The most signiﬁ-
cantly robust variable is short-term external debt, suggesting a central role
for the ﬁnancial channel. Trade variables also clearly matter, although the
relationship is not as tight as one might have expected. Starting from this
simple speciﬁcation, we explore a number of issues, such as the role of
reserves. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd little econometric evidence in support of
the hypothesis that high reserves limited the decline in output in the crisis.
We turn ﬁnally in section III to case studies, looking at Latvia, Russia,
and Chile. Latvia was primarily affected by a ﬁnancial shock, Chile mostly
by a sharp decrease in the terms of trade, and Russia by both strong ﬁnan-
cial and terms of trade shocks. Latvia and Russia suffered large declines in
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2. Other studies that attempt to explain differences across countries in the impact of the
crisis include Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2009), Giannone and others (2009), Berkmen and
others (2009), and Rose and Spiegel (2009a, 2009b). These studies typically use annual data,
either for 2008 alone or for 2008 and 2009, and a larger sample of countries than we do. For
differences across emerging European countries, see Bakker and Gulde (2009) and Berglof,
Korniyenko, and Zettlemeyer (2009). A parallel and larger effort within the IMF (2010),
with more of a focus on policy implications, is currently being conducted. We relate our
results to the various published studies below.
12178-05a_Blanchard_rev1.qxd  8/11/10  12:16 PM  Page 266output. The effect on Chile was milder. Together, the country studies pro-
vide a better understanding of the ways in which initial conditions, together
with the speciﬁc structure of the domestic ﬁnancial sector, the speciﬁc nature
of the capital ﬂows, and the speciﬁc policy actions, shaped the effects of
the crisis in each country.
I. A Model
To organize our thoughts, we start with a standard short-run, open econ-
omy model, modiﬁed, however, in two important ways. First, to capture
the effects of shifts in capital ﬂows, we allow for imperfect capital mobil-
ity. Second, we allow for potentially contractionary effects of a deprecia-
tion stemming from exposure to foreign currency debt.
The model is shamelessly ad hoc, static, and with little role for expecta-
tions.
3 Our excuse for its ad hoc nature is that the micro foundations for
all the complex mechanisms we want to capture are not yet available, and
even if available would make for a complicated model. Our excuse for the
lack of dynamics is that we focus on the effects of the shocks immediately
upon impact, rather than on their dynamic effects. Our excuse for ignoring
expectations is that the direct effect of lower exports and lower capital
ﬂows probably dominated expectational effects, but this excuse is admit-
tedly poor; as we will show, an initial quasi peg on the exchange rate, cou-
pled with anticipations of a future depreciation, initially aggravated capital
outﬂows in Russia in the fall of 2008, making the crisis worse.
The model is composed of two relationships, one characterizing balance
of payments equilibrium, and the other goods market equilibrium.
I.A. Balance of Payments Equilibrium
Balance of payments equilibrium requires that the trade deficit be
ﬁnanced either by net capital ﬂows or by a change in reserves. Taking
capital ﬂows ﬁrst, we consider three different interest rates:
—the policy (riskless) interest rate, denoted by r (given our focus on
the short run, we assume constant domestic and foreign price levels, and
thus zero domestic and foreign inﬂation, and so we make no distinction
between nominal and real interest rates)
—the interest rate at which domestic borrowers (firms, people, and
the government; we make no distinction among them in the model) can
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3. A model in the same spirit as ours, but with more explicit micro foundations and a
narrower scope, is developed in Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004).
12178-05a_Blanchard_rev1.qxd  8/11/10  12:16 PM  Page 267borrow, denoted by r ˆ. Assume that r ˆ = r + x, where x is the risk premium
required by domestic lenders. Think of the United States as the foreign
country, and thus of the dollar as the foreign currency. We assume that the
exchange rate is expected to be constant, so r ˆ is also the domestic dollar
interest rate.
4
—the U.S. dollar interest rate, that is, the rate at which foreign investors
can lend to foreign borrowers abroad, denoted r*. r ˆ − r* is usually referred
to as the EMBI (emerging markets bond index) spread.
Assume that all foreign borrowing is in dollars, so that foreign investors
can choose between foreign and domestic dollar-denominated assets. Let
D be debt vis-à-vis the rest of the world, expressed in dollars. Assume then
that net capital inﬂows (capital inﬂows minus capital outﬂows and interest
payments on the debt), expressed in dollars and denoted by F, are given by
Net capital inﬂows thus depend on the EMBI spread, adjusted for a risk
premium. The assumption that θ is positive captures the home bias of for-
eign investors, who are assumed to be the marginal investors.
5 When risk
increases, foreign investors, if they are to maintain the same level of capi-
tal ﬂows, require a larger increase in the premium than domestic investors.
Net capital inﬂows also depend, negatively, on foreign debt. To think
about the dependence of F on D, assume, for example, that a proportion a
of the debt is short-term debt (that is, debt due this period) and that the
rollover rate is given by b. Then, in the absence of other inﬂows, net capi-
tal ﬂows are given by −[a(1 − b) + r ˆ]D. Thus the higher the debt, or the
higher the proportion of short-term debt, or the lower the rollover rate, the
larger net capital outﬂows will be.
FF rr x D Frr x
F
=− − + ( ) [] −− + ( ) [] > ˆ *, , ˆ *, 11 0 θδ δ θ
δδ D D <> 00 ,. θ
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4. If the exchange rate were expected to change, then the domestic dollar rate would be
given by r ˆ plus expected depreciation. This, in turn, would introduce a dependence of net
ﬂows, considered below, on the expected change in the exchange rate.
5. As the country studies will show, the increase in capital outﬂows by foreigners was
sometimes offset by a symmetric increase in capital inﬂows by domestic residents (such as
in Chile), and sometimes instead reinforced by an increase in capital outﬂows by domestic
residents (such as in Russia). The case where the increase in capital outﬂows was more than
offset by the increase in capital inﬂows can be captured in our model by assuming a negative
value for θ. A more thorough analysis would require explicitly introducing gross ﬂows by
domestic and foreign investors separately, each group with its own perception of risks at
home and abroad.
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For a given policy rate and a given dollar interest rate, an increase in per-
ceived risk or an increase in home bias reduces net capital ﬂows.
We turn next to net exports. We normalize both the domestic and the
foreign price levels, which we have assumed to be constant, to equal 1. Let
e be the nominal exchange rate, deﬁned as the price of domestic currency in
dollars or, equivalently, given our normalization, the price of domestic
goods in terms of U.S. goods. An increase in e then represents a (nominal
and real) appreciation. Assume that net exports, in terms of domestic goods,
are given by
A decrease in domestic economic activity leads to a decrease in imports
and an improvement in net exports; a decrease in foreign activity leads to
a decrease in exports and thus a decrease in net exports. Although the
Marshall-Lerner (ML) condition is likely to hold over the medium run, it
may well not hold over the short run (again, we are looking at the quarter
of the shock and the quarter just following the shock)
6; thus we do not
assign either a positive or a negative sign to the effect of a depreciation on
net exports.
In a number of commodity-exporting countries, the adverse trade effects
of the crisis took the form of a large decrease in commodity prices rather
than a sharp decrease in exports; for our purposes, these shocks have simi-
lar effects. Thus we do not introduce terms of trade shocks formally in the
model.
Let R be the level of foreign reserves, expressed in dollars, or equiva-
lently, in terms of foreign goods. The balance of payments equilibrium
condition is thus given by
() * , , , * . 2 Fr r xD e N XeYY R −− ( ) + ( ) = θΔ
NX NX e Y Y NX Y NX Y = ( ) <> ,,* , , * . δδ δδ 00
() * , . 1 FF rr x D =− − ( ) θ
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6. The Marshall-Lerner condition holds that, given domestic and foreign output, a depre-
ciation improves the trade balance. Some analytical results on the short-run effects of an
exchange rate change on the trade balance are given in von Furstenberg (2003).
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inﬂows or through a decrease in reserves.
I.B. Goods Market Equilibrium
Assume that equilibrium in the goods market is given by
where A is domestic private demand and G is government spending. A
depends positively on income Y, negatively on the domestic borrowing rate
r + x, and negatively on foreign debt expressed in terms of domestic goods
D/e. This last term captures foreign currency exposure and balance sheet
effects: the higher the foreign debt (which we have assumed to be dollar
debt), the larger the increase in the real value of debt from a depreciation,
and the stronger the adverse effect on output.
Note that the net effect of the exchange rate on demand is ambiguous.
A depreciation may or may not increase net exports, depending on whether
the ML condition holds. A depreciation decreases domestic demand,
through balance sheet effects. If the ML condition holds and the balance
sheet effect is weak, the net effect of a depreciation is to increase demand.
But if the ML condition fails, or if it holds but is dominated by the balance
sheet effect, the net effect of a depreciation is to decrease demand. A depre-
ciation is then contractionary.
I.C. Equilibrium and the Effects of Adverse Financial and Trade Shocks
It is easiest to characterize the equilibrium graphically in the exchange
rate–output space (figure 3). There are three possible configurations,
depending on whether the ML condition is satisﬁed (this determines the
slope of the balance of payments curve, BP), and whether, even if the ML
condition is satisﬁed, the net effect of a depreciation is expansionary or
contractionary (this determines the slope of the goods market curve, IS).
We draw the BP and IS curves in ﬁgure 3 under the assumptions that the
ML condition is satisﬁed but that the net effect of a depreciation is con-
tractionary. We discuss the implications of the other cases below.
For given exogenous variables, the balance of payments equation
implies a negative relationship between the exchange rate e and output Y.
As capital ﬂows depend neither on e nor on Y, for unchanged reserves (ΔR
= 0) the BP relationship implies that the trade balance must remain con-
stant. Under the assumption that the ML condition is satisﬁed, the BP
curve is downward sloping: an increase in output, which leads to a deterio-
() , , ,,*, 3 YA Y r x D eG N X e Y Y =+ ( ) ++ ( )
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7. Differentiation is carried out around a zero initial trade balance.
Figure 3. Output and the Exchange Rate in Equilibrium








ration of the trade balance, must be offset by a depreciation, which improves
the trade balance.7
For given exogenous variables, the goods market equilibrium equation
implies a positive relationship between the exchange rate e and output Y.
Under our assumption that the positive effect of a depreciation on net
exports is dominated by the adverse balance sheet effect on private domes-
tic demand, a depreciation leads to a decrease in output. The IS curve is
thus upward sloping. The larger the foreign debt, the stronger the balance
sheet effect and the stronger the adverse effect of a depreciation on output,
and thus the ﬂatter the IS curve.
Equilibrium is given by point A in ﬁgure 3. Having characterized the
equilibrium, we can now look at the effects of different shocks and the role
of policy.
One can think of countries during the crisis as being affected through
two main channels: a ﬁnancial channel, either through an increase in the
financial home bias of foreign investors q, or through an increase in per-
ceived risk x, or both; and a trade channel, through a sharp decrease in
foreign output Y*, and thus a decrease in exports. We consider each of these
in turn.
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8. See, for example, Kannan and Köhler-Geib (2009).
Figure 4. Effects of Financial Shocks on Output and the Exchange Rate











Consider ﬁrst an increase in home bias. This was clearly a central fac-
tor in the crisis, as the need for liquidity led many investors and ﬁnancial
institutions in advanced economies to reduce their foreign lending. The
effect of an increase in θ is shown in ﬁgure 4. For a given policy rate and
unchanged reserves, net capital flows decrease, and so must the trade
balance. This requires a decrease in output at a given exchange rate, and
so the BP curve shifts to the left. The IS curve remains unchanged, and
so the new equilibrium is at point A′. The currency depreciates (the
exchange rate, as we have deﬁned it, falls), and output decreases. The
stronger the balance sheet effect, the ﬂatter the IS curve, and thus the larger
the decrease in output.
Consider next an increase in perceived risk, surely another important
factor in the crisis.
8 Indeed, in many cases it is difﬁcult to distinguish how
much of the outﬂow was due to increased home bias and how much was
due to an increase in perceived risk. The analysis is very similar in either
case, with one difference: whereas an increase in home bias directly affects
only net capital ﬂows, an increase in perceived risk directly affects both
net capital ﬂows and domestic demand. A higher risk premium increases
the domestic borrowing rate, leading to a decrease in domestic demand
and, through that channel, a decrease in output. Thus both the IS and the
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A″. Output unambiguously decreases, and the exchange rate may rise or
fall. The higher the level of debt, the ﬂatter the IS curve, and the larger the
decrease in output.
Finally, consider an adverse trade shock, in the form of a decrease in
foreign output. Again, sharp decreases in exports (and, for commodity pro-
ducers, large adverse terms of trade shocks) were a central factor in the
crisis. Under our stark assumption that net capital flows do not depend
on the exchange rate and, at this stage, the maintained assumption of
unchanged policy settings, the BP relationship implies that net capital
flows must remain the same, and so, by implication, must net exports. At
a given exchange rate, this requires a decrease in imports, and thus a
decrease in output. The BP curve shifts to the left. The IS curve also shifts,
and it is easy to verify that, for a given exchange rate, it shifts by less than
the BP curve. In ﬁgure 5 the equilibrium moves from point A to point A′.
Output is lower, and the exchange rate falls. Here again, the higher the
debt level, the flatter the IS curve, and the larger the adverse effect of the
trade shock on output.
Note that in this model both types of ﬁnancial shock—an increase in
home bias and an increase in risk or uncertainty—force an improvement in
the trade balance. Under our assumptions and in the absence of any policy
reaction, our model implies that trade shocks have no effect on the trade
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Figure 5. Effects of a Trade Shock on Output and the Exchange Rate
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Figure 6. Change in the Trade Balance and Unexpected GDP Growth in Emerging
Market Countries
balance. More realistically, if we think that part of the trade deficit is
financed through reserve decumulation, trade shocks do lead to a dete-
rioration of the trade balance. This suggests a simple examination of the
data, looking at the distribution of trade balance changes across coun-
tries. This is done in ﬁgure 6, which plots unexpected GDP growth over
2008Q3–2009Q1 against the change in the trade balance as a percentage of
2007 GDP. As crude as it is, the ﬁgure suggests a dominant role for ﬁnan-
cial shocks in most countries, in particular in some of the Baltic countries,
with trade shocks playing an important role in Venezuela and Russia (in
both cases more through terms of trade effects than through a sharp drop in
net exports).
We have so far looked at only one of the equilibrium conﬁgurations.
Next we brieﬂy describe the other two.
Consider the case where the ML condition holds, so that a depreciation
improves the trade balance, and the balance sheet effects are weak, so that a
Sources: IMF, Global Data Source and World Economic Outlook; Eurostat. 
a. Defined as in figure 2.
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increases output. The reason is simple: absent a policy reaction, lower cap-
ital ﬂows force a depreciation, and the depreciation increases demand and
output. This is a very standard result, but one that seems at odds with real-
ity, probably because lower capital ﬂows affect demand through channels
other than the exchange rate. Indeed, if the adverse capital ﬂows also reﬂect
in part an increase in perceived risk, the effect on output becomes ambigu-
ous: the favorable effects of the depreciation may be more than offset by
the adverse effect of higher borrowing rates on domestic demand. Trade
shocks, just as in the case examined above, lead to a decrease in output.
Consider ﬁnally the case where the ML condition does not hold, so that
a devaluation leads to a deterioration of the trade balance, and the balance
sheet effects are strong, so that a devaluation is contractionary.
10 In this
case all the previous results hold, but the decrease in output and the depre-
ciation effects are even stronger. Adverse shocks can lead to very large
adverse effects on output, and very large depreciations. Indeed, a further
condition, one that puts bounds on the size of the balance sheet effect and
the violation of the ML condition, is needed to get reasonable compara-
tive statics.
11
I.D. The Role and the Complexity of Policies
The analysis so far has assumed unchanged policies. In reality, one of the
characteristics of this crisis was the active use of monetary and ﬁscal poli-
cies. Our model allows us to think about the effects of interest rate and
exchange rate policies—that is, of using the policy interest rate, or reserve
decumulation, or both—and of ﬁscal policy. A full taxonomy of the effects
of each policy in each of the conﬁgurations is beyond the scope of this
paper. The main insights, and in particular a sense of the complexity of the
situation confronting policymakers in this environment, can, however, be
given easily.
12
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9. In this case both the IS curve and the BP curve are downward sloping. The IS curve is
necessarily the steeper of the two.
10. In this case both the IS curve and the BP curve slope upward.
11. That condition (which is always satisﬁed if the ML condition holds) is the following:
NXe < [(ADD/e
2)NXY]/(1 − AY), where A is domestic private demand and NX is net exports.
Graphically, with the exchange rate plotted on the vertical axis and output on the horizontal
axis, this requires that the slope of the (upward-sloping) IS curve be less than that of the
(upward-sloping) BP curve.
12. Much of this complexity will not surprise those familiar with the earlier Latin Amer-
ican and Asian crises.
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of a policy response, leads to a decrease in net capital ﬂows, a depreciation,
and, we shall assume, a decrease in output (which we argued is the most
likely outcome). One policy option is to increase the policy interest rate, thus
reducing capital outﬂows but also adversely affecting domestic demand. If
the elasticity of ﬂows to the domestic dollar interest rate is small, which
appears to be the case in ﬁnancial crises, the net effect is likely to decrease
rather than increase output. If reserves are available, using them to offset
the decrease in capital ﬂows, while sterilizing so as to leave the policy rate
unchanged, can avoid the depreciation. If a depreciation would be contrac-
tionary, this is a good thing. But the direct effect of higher perceived risk
on the domestic borrowing rate, and thus on domestic demand, remains,
and so output still declines. Thus, to maintain output, sterilized interven-
tion must be combined with expansionary ﬁscal policy.
Consider next a decrease in foreign output, which, in the absence of a
policy response, leads to a depreciation at home and a decrease in domes-
tic output. An increase in the policy rate, to the extent that it increases net
capital flows, allows for a smaller depreciation and thus less adverse
balance sheet effects. But a smaller depreciation also leads to lower net
exports, and a higher policy rate leads to lower domestic demand. The
net effect of these three forces may well be a larger decrease in output.
To the extent that reserves are available, sterilized intervention avoids
the adverse effect of a higher policy rate on output, but the lower net
exports may still lead to a decrease in output. In that case, to maintain
output, sterilized intervention needs again to be used in conjunction with
fiscal policy.
If the policy implications seem complicated, it is because they are.
Whether, when faced with a given shock, a country is better off maintain-
ing its exchange rate depends, among other factors, on the tools it uses—
the policy rate or reserve decumulation—and the strength of the balance
sheet effects it is trying to avoid, and thus the level of dollar-denominated
liabilities.
In this context it is useful to note that foreign debt affects the adjustment
in two ways. We have focused so far on the ﬁrst, through balance sheet
effects on spending. What matters there is the total amount of foreign
currency–denominated debt. The second is through the effects of the for-
eign debt on the change in capital ﬂows. What matters here is the amount
of debt that needs to be reﬁnanced in the short run. The effect then depends
on whether, for a given ﬁnancial shock—be it an increase in home bias or
an increase in uncertainty—a higher initial debt leads to a larger decrease
276 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
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Recall our earlier example, which showed how debt is likely to affect cap-
ital ﬂows, and suppose that an increase in home bias leads investors to
decrease the rollover rate. In this case the larger the debt, the larger will be
the decrease in capital ﬂows, and the more drastic the required trade bal-
ance adjustment. By a similar argument, the larger the current account
deﬁcit, and thus the larger the capital ﬂows before the crisis, the larger the
required trade balance adjustment.
To summarize: The model has shown how adverse ﬁnancial and trade
shocks are all likely to decrease output, while having different effects
on the current account balance. Combinations of reserve decumulation and
ﬁscal expansion can help reduce the decrease in output, but to what extent
they can be used clearly depends on the initial level of reserves and on
the ﬁscal room for maneuver. The model also suggests a number of inter-
actions between initial conditions and the effects of the shocks on output.
Larger foreign debt, in particular, both through its implications for net cap-
ital ﬂows and through balance sheet effects, is likely to amplify the effects
of the shocks. With the model and its implications as a rough guide, we
now turn to the empirical evidence.
II. Econometric Evidence
The evidence points to two main shocks, to trade and to ﬁnancial ﬂows.
Although our focus is on whether we can explain differences across coun-
tries, it is useful to start by looking at the global picture.
II.A. The Collapse of Global Trade and Capital Flows
Figure 7 plots growth in the volume of world exports alongside growth
in world output from 1996Q1 to 2009Q2. It reveals in striking fashion the
parallel collapse of both output and trade during the crisis, but also that
their co-movement in the crisis is not unusual. This second observation has
already been the subject of much controversy and substantial research. For
the two quarters we are focusing on, growth of world output was −6 per-
cent, and growth of world exports was −30 percent (both at annual rates),
implying an elasticity of around 5. The question is whether this elasticity is
unusually large, and if so, why. Historical evidence suggests that this elas-
ticity has been increasing over time, from around 2 in the 1960s to close to
4 in the 2000s (using data up to 2005; Freund 2009, World Economic Out-
look 2009). This suggests that the response of trade to output in this crisis
was larger than expected, but not much larger.
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13. On trade ﬁnance see Auboin (2009). On composition effects see Levchenko, Lewis,
and Tesar (2009), Anderton and Tewolde (2010), and Yi, Bems, and Johnson (2009). On
inventory adjustment see Alessandria, Kabosky, and Midrigan (2009).
Figure 7. Growth in World Output and World Trade, 1996–2009
Sources: Netherlands CPB Trade Monitor; IMF, Global Data Source.
a. Quarter over quarter, at an annual rate.
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Three main hypotheses for why the response was larger have been
explored. The first invokes constraints on trade finance. The second
involves composition effects: the large increase in uncertainty that charac-
terized the crisis may have led to a larger decrease in durables consump-
tion and in investment than in typical recessions. Because both of these
components have a high import content, the effect on imports was larger
for a given decrease in GDP. The third hypothesis relates to the presence
of international production chains and the behavior of inventories. High
uncertainty led firms to cut production and rely more on inventories of
intermediate goods than in other recent recessions, leading to a larger
decrease in imports.
13 We read the evidence as mostly supportive of the
last two explanations.
The top panel of ﬁgure 8 plots net private capital ﬂows, and the bottom
panel the change in cross-border bank liabilities, for various regional sub-
groupings of emerging market countries, from 2006Q1 to 2009Q2. The
ﬁgure documents the sharp downturn of net ﬂows, from large and positive
before the crisis to large and negative during the period we are focusing
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Figure 8. Capital Flows to Emerging Market Countries, 2006–09a
Sources: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics; Bank for International Settlements.
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decrease affecting emerging Europe, and to a lesser extent emerging Asia.
II.B. A Benchmark Speciﬁcation: Growth, Trade, and Debt
Having documented the global pattern, we now turn to the heterogene-
ity of country outcomes. We focus on the same 29 emerging market coun-
tries as before. The sample is geographically diverse, covering parts of
Central and Eastern Europe, emerging Asia, Latin America, and Africa.
14
Our benchmark speciﬁcation focuses on the relationship of unexpected
growth (the forecast error for output growth during the semester composed
of 2008Q4 and 2009Q1) to a simple trade variable and a simple ﬁnancial
variable. Using the unexpected component of growth allows us to separate
out the impact of the crisis from domestic trends that were already in place
leading up to 2008Q4.
15
We consider two trade variables. The first captures trade exposure,
defined as the export share of GDP (in percent) in 2007. More open
economies are likely to be exposed to a larger trade shock. The second
is unexpected partner growth, deﬁned as the export-weighted average of
actual growth in the country’s trading partners, minus the corresponding
forecast, scaled by the export share in GDP. For a given export share, the
worse the output performance of the countries to which a country exports,
the worse the trade shock.
16
Figure 9 shows scatterplots of unexpected GDP growth against the export
share (top panel) and against unexpected partner growth (bottom panel).
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14. The sample is the union of all countries classiﬁed as “emerging and developing” in
the World Economic Outlook (WEO) and those classiﬁed as either emerging markets or
frontier markets in Standard & Poor’s Emerging Markets Database (EMDB) for which we
have quarterly GDP data and quarterly IMF forecasts of GDP.
15. We have also explored the relationship using two larger datasets. The ﬁrst is a set of
33 emerging market countries for which quarterly data on GDP are available but forecasts
are missing in some cases; in that exercise we used de-meaned growth as the dependent vari-
able, constructed as growth minus mean growth over 1995–2007. The second is a set of 36
emerging market countries for which quarterly data on industrial production can be used to
create an interpolated series for quarterly GDP. The results, available in an online appendix
(www.brookings.edu/economics/bpea, under “Conferences and Papers”), are largely similar
to those presented here.
16. A caveat: if exports to another country are part of a value chain, and thus later reex-
ported, what matters is not so much the growth rate of the ﬁrst importing country, but the
growth rate of the eventual country of destination. That this is relevant is illustrated by the
case of Taiwan, whose exports to China are largely reexported to other markets. The
decrease in Taiwan’s exports to China in 2008Q4 was 50 percent (at an annual rate), much
larger than can be explained by the mild slowdown in growth in China during that quarter.
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Figure 9. Unexpected GDP Growth, Export Share, and Unexpected Partner Growth in
Emerging Market Countries, 2008Q3–2009Q1
a
Sources: IMF, Global Data Source and World Economic Outlook; Eurostat. and authors’ calculations.
a. Unexpected growth is defined as in figure 2.
b. Scaled by the export share of 2007 GDP; data are seasonally adjusted at an annual rate.
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growth is stronger. A cross-country regression of the latter delivers an R
2
of 0.22 and implies that a decrease in unexpected partner growth by 1 per-
centage point is associated with a decrease in domestic unexpected growth
of about 1.4 percentage points.
17
We consider two ﬁnancial variables, both of which aim at capturing
ﬁnancial exposure. The ﬁrst is the ratio of short-term foreign debt to GDP in
2007. Short-term debt is deﬁned as liabilities coming due in the following
12 months, including long-term debt with a remaining maturity of 1 year or
less. The second is the ratio of the current account deﬁcit to GDP for 2007.
The rationale, from our model, is that the larger the initial short-term debt,
or the larger the initial current account deﬁcit, the larger the likely adverse
effects of a ﬁnancial shock.
18
Figure 10 shows scatterplots of unexpected growth over 2008Q4–
2009Q1 against short-term debt (top panel) and against the current account
deﬁcit (bottom panel), both in 2007. The relationship between short-term
debt and unexpected growth is strong. A cross-country regression yields an
R
2 of 0.41 and implies that an increase of 10 percentage points in the initial
ratio of short-term debt to GDP decreases unexpected growth by 3.3 per-
centage points (at an annual rate; the relationship remains when the Baltic
states are removed from the sample). There is also a relationship between
unexpected growth and the initial current account deﬁcit, but it is much
weaker than that for short-term debt.
Bivariate scatterplots take us only so far. Table 1 shows the results of
simple cross-country multivariate regressions in which unexpected growth
is the dependent variable and one of the trade and one of the ﬁnancial mea-
sures are independent variables. The export share, when included in the
regression with short-term external debt (column 1-1), is signed as pre-
dicted but only weakly signiﬁcant. Unexpected partner growth is also
signed as predicted and signiﬁcant in all regressions where it is included.
Short-term debt is always strongly signiﬁcant. When the current account
deﬁcit is introduced as the only “ﬁnancial” variable, it has the predicted
sign and is signiﬁcant. When introduced in addition to short-term debt,
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17. In our sample the means of unexpected growth, short-term debt to GDP, and unex-
pected partner growth, respectively, are −13.5 percent, 18 percent, and −4.2 percent, and the
respective standard deviations are 7.8, 15, and 2.6.
18. Ideally, one would want to construct a variable conceptually symmetrical to that
used for trade, namely, a weighted average of ﬁnancial inﬂows into partner countries, using
relative bilateral debt positions as weights and scaling by the ratio of foreign liabilities to
GDP. Data on relative bilateral debt positions are not available, however.
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Figure 10. Unexpected GDP Growth, Short-Term Debt, and the Current Account
Deﬁcit in Emerging Market Countries, 2008Q3–2009Q1
Sources: IMF, Global Data Source and World Economic Outlook; Eurostat; and authors’ regressions.
a. Defined as in figure 2.
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12178-05a_Blanchard_rev1.qxd  8/11/10  12:16 PM  Page 283however, it is no longer signiﬁcant. When the ﬁnancial variable is the sum
of short-term debt and the current account deﬁcit (that is, the short-term
ﬁnancing requirement), the coefﬁcient is less negative than that on short-
term debt alone. The estimated constant (which should be zero if we assume
that a country with no trade and no foreign debt would have been immune
to the crisis) is negative and signiﬁcant in all regressions. This suggests that
some of the average unexpected output decline during the crisis is not
explained by the right-hand-side variables.
Nevertheless, these baseline regressions suggest that trade and ﬁnan-
cial shocks can explain a good part of the heterogeneity in country out-
comes. Using results from column 1-2 of table 1, ﬁgure 11 decomposes
the variation across countries in unexpected growth (relative to the sample
average)—similar to what is shown in ﬁgure 2—into variation explained by
unexpected partner growth, variation explained by short-term debt, and the
284 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
Table 1. Regressions Explaining Unexpected GDP Growth with Trade and 
Short-Term Debta
Regression




Unexpected trading-partner  0.73* 1.35*** 0.84* 0.93**
growth
c (0.38) (0.40) (0.42) (0.37)
Short-term external debt





Short-term external debt +− 0.18***
current account deﬁcit
e (0.03)
Constant −4.67* −5.46** −7.51*** −5.82** −6.13***
(2.47) (2.16) (1.97) (2.18) (2.04)
No. of observations 29 29 29 29 29
Adjusted R
2 0.46 0.46 0.39 0.46 0.46
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. The dependent variable is GDP growth over 2008Q4 and 2009Q1, seasonally adjusted at an annual
rate (SAAR), minus the April 2008 IMF forecast of GDP growth over the same period. Robust standard
errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity, are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at
the ***0.01, **0.05, or *0.1 level.
b. Nominal exports as a percent of nominal GDP in 2007.
c. Trade-weighted average of actual growth in trading partners over 2008Q4 and 2009Q1 minus cor-
responding forecast growth, SAAR, multiplied by the partner’s export share of nominal 2007 GDP.
d. Debt with remaining maturity of less than 1 year in 2007, as a percent of 2007 nominal GDP.
e. As a percent of 2007 nominal GDP.
12178-05a_Blanchard_rev1.qxd  8/11/10  12:16 PM  Page 284OLIVIER J. BLANCHARD, MITALI DAS, and HAMID FARUQEE 285
19. See, for example, Patillo, Poirson, and Ricci (2002). Their results are for the ratio of
total debt, rather than just short-term debt, to GDP, and for actual rather than unexpected
growth.
Figure 11. Decomposition of GDP Growth in Emerging Market Countries,
2008Q3–2009Q1
a
Sources: IMF, Global Data Source and World Economic Outlook; Eurostat; and authors’ calculations






































































































































































































































residual. Although, in general, countries with worse outcomes had larger
debt (this is especially true of the Baltic states) and a larger decline in
exports, it is clear that this regression leaves the outcome in some countries
(Turkey and Russia, for example) largely unexplained.
In what follows we use the regression reported in column 1-2 of table 1,
with unexpected partner growth and short-term debt as the explanatory
variables, as our baseline. These results imply that an increase in the ratio
of short-term debt to GDP of 10 percentage points leads to a decrease in
unexpected GDP growth of 2.8 percentage points, and a decrease in unex-
pected partner growth of 1 percentage point leads to a decrease in unex-
pected GDP growth of 0.7 percentage point (much smaller than in the
bivariate regression). The magnitude of the short-term debt effect appears
to be consistent with that found in other studies.
19
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ables, as well as the effects of institutions and policies. Given the small
number of observations, one should be realistic about what can be learned.
But as we shall show, some results are suggestive and interesting.
II.C. Alternative Trade Measures
We explored a number of alternative or additional trade measures. None
emerges as strongly signiﬁcant, and no speciﬁcation obviously dominates
our baseline regression.
20
The trade variable we use in the baseline does not capture changes in
the terms of trade. In many countries, however, the crisis was associated
with a dramatic decline in the terms of trade. Oil prices, for example,
dropped by 60 percent during the crisis semester relative to the previous
semester. Thus we constructed a commodity terms of trade variable for
each country, deﬁned as the rate of change in the country’s export-weighted
commodity prices times the 2007 commodity export share in GDP, minus
the rate of change in the country’s import-weighted commodity prices
times 2007 commodity imports as a percent of GDP. The variable ranges
from −26 percent for Venezuela to +8 percent for Thailand; 11 countries
experience a deterioration of their terms of trade by this measure, and 18
see an improvement.
21 When we add the variable to the baseline regres-
sion, its coefﬁcient is close to zero and is not signiﬁcant, and the coefﬁ-
cients on unexpected partner growth and on short-term debt are roughly
unchanged.
The earlier discussion of the response of global trade to output suggests
that the composition of exports may be relevant. And indeed, other work
(Sommer 2009) has documented a striking relationship among a sample of
advanced economies between the share of high- and medium-technology
manufacturing in GDP and growth during the crisis. To test whether this
was the case for our sample of emerging market countries, we constructed
such a share for each country, relying on disaggregated data from the UN
Industrial Development Organization. Again the coefﬁcient is close to zero
and not signiﬁcant, and the other coefﬁcients are little affected.
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20. The full results from the set of alternative regressions described in this and the next
subsection are available in the online appendix.
21. A better variable would be the unexpected change in the terms of trade. Unfortu-
nately, forecasts of prices for all relevant commodities are not available. Given that most
commodity prices follow a random walk, the use of the actual rather than the unexpected
change in the terms of trade is unlikely to be a major issue.
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growth variable on demand if exports are part of a value chain, that is, if
they are partly produced using imports as intermediate goods. One would
like to measure the share of exports by the ratio of value added in exports
to GDP, but the data are not available. Instead we constructed a proxy for
this share by relying on the import content of exports for the 10 largest
export industries (ranked by gross value) for each country, from the Global
Trade Analysis Project. The adjustment is typically largest for the small
countries of emerging Europe: for example, the export share is reduced
by roughly half for Hungary.
22 The results of using this adjusted partner
growth measure are similar to those in the baseline. As expected, the coef-
ﬁcient is somewhat larger than that obtained using the original share, but it
is not signiﬁcant, and the other coefﬁcients are roughly unchanged.
The unexpected change in real exports is clearly the most direct measure
of the trade shock. The reason for not using it in the baseline is that it is
also likely to be partly endogenous, and thus subject to potential bias. We
nevertheless ran a regression using the change in real exports (export fore-
casts do not exist, and therefore we used the actual change rather than
the unexpected change). The results are largely similar to those using
unexpected partner growth.
23
II.D. Alternative Financial Measures
Our model suggests that both total foreign debt (through balance
sheet effects) and short-term debt (through capital flows) should matter.
We therefore explored a number of alternative measures for the finan-
cial variable.
We included total foreign liabilities as a percentage of GDP in 2007 as
an additional explanatory variable in the baseline regression. This “ﬁnan-
cial openness” measure is not signiﬁcant, and the coefﬁcients on both short-
term debt and trade are roughly unaffected. These results are consistent
with those of Philip Lane and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti (2010).
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22. This approach does not address another problem raised by value chains and dis-
cussed earlier in the context of Taiwan, namely, the fact that exports to another country may
then be reexported and thus depend on growth in the ultimate rather than the initial importer
country.
23. Taken literally, the coefﬁcient on real exports, 0.43, can be interpreted as the domes-
tic multiplier associated with real exports, whereas the coefﬁcient on partner growth, 0.73,
can be interpreted as the multiplier for real exports times the partner countries’ average elas-
ticity of imports to GDP.
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particular, is whether the composition of short-term debt, and especially the
relative importance of bank debt, was an important factor in determining
the effects of the crisis on output. Some have argued that given their prob-
lems at home, foreign banks were often one of the main sources of capital
outﬂows. Others have argued that, to the contrary, banks played a stabiliz-
ing role in many countries. They point, for example, to the Vienna Initia-
tive, in which a number of major Western banks have agreed to roll over
their debt to a number of Central European economies. To explore this
question, we decomposed short-term debt into that owed to foreign banks
(that is, banks reporting to the Bank for International Settlements) and that
owed to foreign nonbanks, both expressed as a ratio to GDP in 2007.
24 The
coefﬁcients on both types of debt are negative and signiﬁcant. The coefﬁ-
cient on bank debt is less negative, suggesting that, other things equal, it
was indeed an advantage to have a higher proportion of bank debt.
One might argue from the U.S. experience that the effects of the ﬁnan-
cial shock on other countries depended on the degree of regulation of their
ﬁnancial system. In a provocative paper, Domenico Giannone, Michele
Lenza, and Lucrezia Reichlin (2009) have argued that, controlling for other
factors, the “better” the regulation, at least as assessed by the Fraser Insti-
tute, the worse the output decline during the crisis.
25 Their result suggests
that what was thought by some to be light, and thus good, regulation before
the crisis turned out to make things worse doing the crisis. When we intro-
duce this index as an additional regressor, it has the same sign as that found
by Giannone and others but is not signiﬁcant.
Finally, we explored the role of net capital (both bank and nonbank)
flows directly as right-hand-side variables (instead of short-term debt).
These are natural variables to use, but they cannot be taken as exogenous:
worse shocks or worse institutions probably triggered larger net capital out-
ﬂows. We therefore took an instrumental variables approach, using indexes
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24. The decomposition is not clean. The numbers for total short-term debt include not
only short-term debt instruments, but also longer-term debt maturing within the year. How-
ever, the numbers for foreign bank debt, which come from the Bank for International Settle-
ments rather than the World Economic Outlook database, include only short-term debt
instruments but not longer-term debt maturing within the year that is owed to foreign banks.
25. The index, which is part of an Index of Economic Freedom, is constructed from
measures of the ownership of banks (the percentage of deposits held in privately owned
banks), competition (the extent to which domestic banks face competition from foreign
banks), extension of credit (the percentage of credit extended to the private sector), and the
presence of interest rate controls. The highest value of the index for the countries in our sam-
ple is 9.6 for Lithuania, and the lowest is 6.1 for Brazil.
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again from the Fraser Institute) as instruments, in addition to unexpected
partner growth and short-term external debt. These plausibly affected
growth during the crisis only through their effects on capital flows. The
ﬁrst-stage regressions suggest a strong negative effect of capital account
convertibility on net ﬂows: countries that were more open ﬁnancially had
larger net outﬂows. The second-stage regressions suggest that declines in
net capital ﬂows were indeed harmful to growth, more so for changes in
bank ﬂows. But these regressions were not robust to the speciﬁc choice of
instruments.
II.E. The Role of Reserves
Many countries accumulated large reserves before the crisis, and one of
the lessons many countries appear to have drawn from the crisis is that
they may need even more. Our model indeed suggests that reserve decu-
mulation can play a useful role in limiting the effects of trade and ﬁnancial
shocks on output.
Column 2-1 of table 2 shows that when unexpected partner growth is
controlled for, the ratio of reserves to short-term debt is statistically and
OLIVIER J. BLANCHARD, MITALI DAS, and HAMID FARUQEE 289
Table 2. Regressions Explaining Unexpected Growth with Reservesa
Regression




Ratio of reserves to short-term external debt, 2007
c 2.68**
(1.15)
Short-term external debt, as a percent of GDP, 2007
c −6.35***
(1.62)









a. The dependent variable is GDP growth over 2008Q4 and 2009Q1, seasonally adjusted at an annual
rate (SAAR), minus the April 2008 IMF forecast of GDP growth over the same period. Robust standard
errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity, are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at
the ***0.01, **0.05, or *0.1 level.
b. Trade-weighted average for the country’s trading partners of projected GDP growth over 2008Q4
and 2009Q1 minus actual growth over the same period, SAAR, multiplied by the partner’s export share
of nominal 2007 GDP.
c. In logarithms.
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reserves variable is entered in logarithmic form.) The coefﬁcient implies
that a 50 percent increase in the ratio increases unexpected growth by
1.3 percentage points. This would suggest a relevant role for reserves. The
question is, however, whether this effect comes from the denominator or
the numerator, or both. To answer it, column 2-2 enters the log of the ratio
of short-term debt to GDP and the log of the ratio of reserves to GDP sep-
arately. The results are reasonably clear: the coefﬁcient on short-term debt
is large and signiﬁcant, and the coefﬁcient on reserves is incorrectly signed
and insigniﬁcant.
We have explored this result at some length, using different controls and
conditioning or not on the exchange rate regime, and found it to be robust.
Although in some speciﬁcations the coefﬁcient has the predicted sign, it is
typically insigniﬁcant and much smaller in absolute value than the coefﬁ-
cient on short-term debt. The econometric evidence is obviously crude
and is not the last word, but it should force a reexamination of the issue.
26
Anecdotal evidence suggests that even when reserves were high, countries
were reluctant to use them, for fear of using them too early, or that the use
of reserves would be perceived as a signal of weakness, or that ﬁnancial
markets would consider the lower reserve levels inadequate.
27
II.F. The Role of the Exchange Rate Regime
The question of whether, other things equal, countries with fixed
exchange rates did better or worse in the crisis is clearly also an important
one. Our model has shown that the theoretical answer is ambiguous,
depending, for given shocks, on whether the ML condition is satisfied or
violated, on the strength of balance sheet effects, and on the policies used
to maintain the peg, namely, the combination of policy rate increases and
reserve decumulation.
We look at the evidence by dividing countries into two groups according
to whether they had a ﬁxed or a more ﬂexible exchange rate regime in 2008.
We adopt the classiﬁcation system used at the IMF, which is based on an
assessment of de facto rather than de jure arrangements. Thus the deﬁni-
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26. The result is consistent with other studies such as Berkmen and others (2009).
Trivedi and Ahmed (2010) also ﬁnd that the level of reserves did not directly affect output,
although larger reserves buffers resulted in a lower rise in country risk premiums and a
smaller fall in exchange rates.
27. For more on the “fear of losing international reserves,” see Aizenman (2009) and
Aizenman and Sun (2009).
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tender (including members of currency unions), currency boards, narrow
horizontal bands, and de facto pegs. Russia’s exchange rate regime, for
example, was reclassiﬁed from a managed ﬂoat to a (de facto) ﬁxed rate in
2008, as it tried to stabilize the value of its currency through heavy inter-
vention and use of its ample foreign exchange reserves. We constructed a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the country had a ﬁxed exchange rate regime
in 2008, and zero otherwise.
Under this classiﬁcation, countries with ﬁxed exchange rates saw unex-
pected declines in real output by an average of 18.6 percent (14.6 percent
if one excludes the Baltic states) during the crisis semester, compared with
11.3 percent for the group with more ﬂexible exchange rates. Although
this appears to be evidence against ﬁxed rates, it does not control for the
size of the shock. This is what we do in table 3, starting from our baseline
speciﬁcation. Column 3-1 adds the exchange rate regime as a regressor.
The resulting coefficient is negative and insignificant. Its value implies
that, controlling for trade and short-term debt, a country with a ﬁxed-rate
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Table 3. Regressions Explaining Unexpected Growth with the Exchange Rate Regimea
Regression







Exchange rate regime dummy
d −2.72 −0.56
(3.50) (5.38)








a. The dependent variable is GDP growth over 2008Q4 and 2009Q1, seasonally adjusted at an annual
rate (SAAR), minus the April 2008 IMF forecast of GDP growth over the same period. Robust standard
errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity, are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at
the ***0.01, **0.05, or *0.1 level.
b. Trade-weighted average for the country’s trading partners of projected GDP growth over 2008Q4
and 2009Q1 minus actual growth over the same period, SAAR, multiplied by the partner’s export share
of nominal 2007 GDP.
c. Debt with remaining maturity of less than 1 year in 2007, as a percent of 2007 nominal GDP.
d. Equals 1 if the country had a ﬁxed exchange rate regime in 2008, and zero otherwise.
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adding an interaction term between foreign currency debt and the exchange
rate. Although exploring the presence of interactions in samples of 
29 observations is surely overambitious, column 3-2 introduces an inter-
action between the exchange rate and the ratio of short-term debt to GDP.
The resulting coefﬁcient is negative but insigniﬁcant. Taken at face value,
it suggests that the adverse effects of short-term debt may have been
stronger in countries with a ﬁxed exchange rate.
We also explored the role of ﬁscal policy. Many countries, for example,
India, reacted to the crisis with large fiscal stimuli. In most cases, how-
ever, given the decision and spending lags involved, their implementation
started either at or after the end of the crisis semester. Nevertheless, we
constructed a variable capturing the change in the cyclically adjusted pri-
mary ﬁscal balance from 2008 to 2009 as a ratio to GDP.
28 When added to
the baseline regression, this variable was statistically insigniﬁcant over the
initial period of the crisis. We leave it to further work to examine the effec-
tiveness of ﬁscal stimulus over a longer period.
In summary, despite the limitations of a small sample, the economet-
rics suggest a number of conclusions. The most statistically and econom-
ically signiﬁcant variable on a consistent basis is short-term foreign debt.
There is some evidence that bank debt had less of an adverse effect than
nonbank debt. Short-term debt does not appear to proxy for other vari-
ables. Trade, measured by trade-weighted growth in partner countries,
also matters; its effect is economically but not always statistically signiﬁ-
cant. Alternative measures of trade, focusing on composition effects, do
not appear to do better. Of the policy dimensions, the most interesting
result is the weak role of reserves. Although the ratio of reserves to short-
term debt is significant, its effect comes mostly from short-term debt
rather than from reserves.
III. Country Studies
Econometrics cannot capture the richness and the complexity of the crisis
in each country. Only studies of speciﬁc countries can give a sense of how
the trade and the ﬁnancial channels actually operated. For this reason, we
turn next to case studies of three countries, Latvia, Russia, and Chile.
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12178-05a_Blanchard_rev1.qxd  8/11/10  12:16 PM  Page 292III.A. Latvia and the Role of Banks
No other country may be as emblematic of this crisis as Latvia. Output
there declined at an annual rate of 18
1⁄2 percent in 2008Q4 and of 38 per-
cent in 2009Q1. (Table 4 provides some basic macroeconomic statistics for
Latvia.) In contrast to most other countries, growth in Latvia is forecast to
remain negative in 2010. The obvious question is why the output decline
was so large.
In the case of Latvia, the right starting point is not the start of the crisis
itself, but the boom that the economy experienced in the 2000s—before and
after its accession to the European Union in 2004. GDP growth exceeded
6 percent each year from 2000 to 2007, reaching or exceeding 10 percent
each year from 2005 to 2007. Inﬂation, low and stable until 2005, increased
to 7 percent by 2006 and to 14 percent in 2007. Asset prices boomed. Stock
market capitalization increased by 32 percent a year in nominal terms from
2005 to 2007. The evidence also suggests very large increases in housing
prices: in Riga, housing prices increased by 367 percent from 2005 to 2007.
The domestic currency, the lat, was pegged to the euro in 2005 (it had been
pegged to the SDR previously), so that higher inﬂation led to a steady real
appreciation.
The main cause of the boom was wider access to credit, largely through
local subsidiaries of foreign banks, leading to very rapid domestic credit
growth. From 2005 to 2007, annual domestic credit growth exceeded 
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Table 4. Latvia: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators, 2005–09
Average, 2008 2008 2008 2008 2009
Indicator 2005–07 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
GDP growth
a 10.7 −10.2 −7.4 −6.1 −18.5 −38.4
Current account
b −19.0 −17.1 −15.6 −11.5 −7.4 −1.4
Consumer price  7.8 16.3 17.6 15.8 12.2 9.2
inﬂation
c
Real effective  94.8 109.2 112.8 112.4 113.8 120.3
exchange rate
d
Stock market  1,829.0 1,814.2 1,828.4 1,480.0 1,166.4 1,051.6
capitalization
e
Change in stock market  32.3 9.5 −16.6 −38.4 −44.4 −40.3
capitalization
c
Sources: IMF, Global Data Source and International Financial Statistics; Riga Stock Exchange.
a. Quarter over quarter, seasonally adjusted at an annual rate, percent.
b. Percent of GDP.
c. Year over year, percent.
d. CPI-based, 2000 = 100.
e. Millions of euros.
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lar residential investment. One result was steadily larger current account
deficits, which in 2007 reached an astounding 24 percent of GDP. Capi-
tal inﬂows increasingly took the form of bank ﬂows, from foreign parent
banks to domestic subsidiaries. By the end of 2007, gross external debt
had reached almost 135 percent of GDP, and short-term external debt was
58 percent of GDP. Foreign ownership of Latvia’s banks, primarily by
Nordic banks, was 60 percent. Foreign currency debt was 86 percent of
the total. More than two-thirds of the loans were backed by real estate.
Reserves were only 20 percent of GDP.
In short, Latvia was very much exposed to foreign financial shocks. A
slowdown, however, preceded the crisis. By early 2007, signs of over-
heating and of an impending bust were starting to become apparent.
House prices peaked in early 2007 and then started to decline sharply. In
February, Standard & Poor’s changed its outlook on Latvia from stable to
negative. Growth decreased throughout the year and turned sharply nega-
tive in each of the ﬁrst three quarters of 2008. Forecast growth for 2008Q4
and 2009Q1, from the April 2008 World Economic Outlook, was −1.5 per-
cent at an annual rate. For the most part, it was the (un)natural end of a
boom. Financial factors also played a role. Worried about the decrease in
the value of real estate collateral and the likely increase in nonperform-
ing loans, Swedish banks instructed their subsidiaries to decrease credit
growth. The (reported) average rate charged by banks to domestic borrow-
ers remained stable, however, until September 2008, suggesting that credit
tightening played a limited role in the initial slowdown.
Until September, it appeared that Latvia was headed for a long period of
stagnation, perhaps similar to that of Portugal after euro entry. The crisis,
however, led to a dramatic decrease in output. Part of this was due to trade.
But as ﬁgure 9 shows, the decline in GDP was much larger than could be
explained by trade. The rest must be attributed to a combination of ﬁnan-
cial factors.
Despite problems at home, Nordic banks, for the most part, maintained
their credit lines to their subsidiaries—but with a sharp deceleration from
earlier high rates of credit growth. The reduced level of credit proved
insufﬁcient to ﬁnance Latvia’s large current account deﬁcit. Broad com-
mitments by foreign banks to maintain credit lines were part of the IMF-
supported program in December 2008.
29 But the same was not true of
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12178-05a_Blanchard_rev1.qxd  8/11/10  12:16 PM  Page 294domestic banks. One of them in particular, Parex, with assets equal to
20 percent of GDP and relying heavily on foreign depositors, suffered a
run by foreign and then by domestic depositors. In November the Latvian
treasury and the central bank stepped in, both to guarantee some of the
debt and to provide liquidity. In the second semester, liquidity provision
operations associated with Parex alone amounted to $1.1 billion, or more
than 3 percent of GDP. Finally, worry about a possible devaluation led to
a large-scale shift from lat to euro deposits by domestic residents.
The strategy of the central bank in reaction to these shocks was twofold:
ﬁrst, to avoid balance sheet effects and maintain the peg using reserves,
and second, to provide liquidity to the ﬁnancial system and maintain a low
policy interest rate. The result was a large decrease in reserves. Table 5
reports Latvia’s current account, ﬁnancial account, and reserves during this
period. (To keep these numbers in perspective, note that Latvian GDP was
$33 billion in 2008.) Large net outﬂows from domestic banks led to large
decreases in reserves, only partly compensated through exceptional ﬁnanc-
ing from the European Union and the IMF. In the second half of 2008, the
central bank lost roughly one-fourth of its initial reserves. However, the
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Table 5. Latvia: Current Account, Capital Flows, and Reserves, 2005–09
Millions of dollars
Average, 2008 2008 2008 2008 2009
Indicator 2005–07 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
Exports of goods   10,524.9 3,843.4 4,265.1 4,341.7 3,507.5 2,816.6
and services
a
Imports of goods   −15,322.7 −5,313.4 −5,954.9 −5,745.2 −4,205.3 −2,853.9
and services
a
Current account  −4,312.8 −1,336.3 −1,397.7 −1,147.3 −610.7 77.1
balance
b
Net bank ﬂows 3,891.8 707.9 1,207.7 1,245.7 −1,230.4 −1,486.1
Net nonbank   1,369.0 1,276.2 4.1 −116.8 160.8 600.5
ﬁnancial ﬂows




ing from IMF and 
European Union
Change in reserves
d 966.8 446.3 110.9 −64.7 −979.2 −639.7
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.
a. Includes factor income ﬂows.
b. Includes transfers.
c. Excludes changes in reserves and ofﬁcial (IMF) ﬁnancing.
d. Differs from the sum of the current account balance, the ﬁnancial account balance, and ofﬁcial
ﬁnancing due to errors and omissions (not shown).
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in 2008Q1 to a small surplus in 2009Q1, which limited further losses in
reserves. This turnaround came from a sharp drop in imports, itself reﬂect-
ing the sharp drop in domestic demand.
This drop in domestic demand raises an important puzzle. Given that
the central bank was willing both to use reserves to maintain the exchange
rate and to provide liquidity and maintain a low policy rate, why was the
decrease in demand so dramatic? Why didn’t the banks, which had relied
on foreign credit, fully maintain credit by turning to the central bank for
liquidity and to the foreign exchange market if they needed foreign cur-
rency? In other words, why wasn’t sterilized intervention enough to pre-
vent major effects on real activity? The answer is probably twofold.
First, as already noted, foreign banks gave instructions to their sub-
sidiaries to reduce their domestic credit exposure. To the extent that the sub-
sidiaries were limited in the amount of loans they could extend, they had no
incentive to borrow at the policy (or at the interbank) rate. In other words,
even generous liquidity provision by the central bank would not have led to
greater extension of credit by the subsidiaries. In terms of our model, the
shadow borrowing rate went up as credit was rationed. Second, doubts
about the banks’ solvency, coming from the initial shocks, the decrease in
housing prices, and the associated decrease in the value of collateral, led,
just as in the advanced economies, to a higher interbank rate and, in turn, to
higher borrowing rates. The Rigibor, the Latvian equivalent of the LIBOR
(London interbank offered rate), went up from 6 percent in August to 14 per-
cent in December. The average rate on lat-denominated loans by banks
went up from about 10 percent in August to almost 16 percent in December.
In terms of our model, the crisis clearly increased x and thus r + x.
We draw two main lessons from the Latvian experience. The ﬁrst con-
cerns the complex role of banks in the transmission of ﬁnancial shocks. On
the one hand, foreign banks largely maintained their exposure, more so
than other foreign investors and depositors. On the other, direct restrictions
on credit limited the usefulness of liquidity provision by the central bank.
The second, related, and more general lesson is that even when central
banks are willing to use reserves and provide liquidity, the adverse output
effects of capital outﬂows on credit and, in turn, on economic activity can
still be very large.
III.B. Russia and the Role of Reserves
Aside from the Baltics, Russia is the country in our sample that suffered
the largest output decline during the crisis. Although output declined by
296 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
12178-05a_Blanchard_rev1.qxd  8/11/10  12:16 PM  Page 296only 9 percent at an annual rate in 2008Q4, it then declined by 30 percent
in 2009Q1. The question, again, is why output fell so steeply.
To answer this question, one needs again to start long before the crisis.
When the crisis came, the Russian economy had been booming for some
time. Growth had averaged 7 percent per year from 2000 to 2007, and 8 per-
cent from 2005 to 2007. (Table 6 gives basic macroeconomic numbers for
2005–07 and for each quarter from 2008Q1 to 2009Q1.) The boom was due
in large part to the increase in the price of oil and the associated increase in
oil export revenue, and the economy showed all the signs of a commodity
price-led boom. In sharp contrast to the Baltics, however, Russia’s boom
was accompanied by large current account surpluses, running on average
at 10 percent of GDP from 2000 to 2007 and at 8.9 percent of GDP from
2005 to 2007. Large ﬁscal surpluses reﬂected high oil revenues, and the
public debt fell steadily. In 2007 the primary ﬁscal balance showed a sur-
plus of 7.4 percent of GDP (the primary nonoil balance showed, however,
a deﬁcit of 3.3 percent of GDP), and the ratio of public debt to GDP fell
below 10 percent. Oil revenue was partly allocated to two stabilization
funds, to smooth the effects of fluctuating oil prices on spending. Infla-
tion was high but stable at around 10 percent. Bank credit growth was
extremely high, running at an annual rate of 40 percent from 2001 to 2007.
The current account surpluses, combined with large capital inﬂows, led
to a large buildup of reserves. By December 2007, reserves (including
the foreign asset positions of the two oil stabilization funds) had reached
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Table 6. Russia: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators, 2005–09
Average, 2008 2008 2008 2008 2009
Indicator 2005–07 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
GDP growth
a 7.9 9.6 5.1 −1.3 −8.8 −29.7
Current account
b 8.9 7.3 6.4 7.1 3.5 0.9
Consumer price inﬂation
c 10.5 12.9 14.8 15.0 13.8 13.8
Real effective exchange rate
d 163.3 181.5 186.7 187.3 189.5 165.1
Stock market  140.4 189.0 195.4 109.4 55.8 57.0
capitalization
e
Change in stock market  69.2 4.9 5.4 −39.2 −71.5 −69.9
capitalization
c
Sources: IMF, Global Data Source and International Financial Statistics; Russian Trading System
Stock Exchange.
a. Quarter over quarter, seasonally adjusted at an annual rate, percent.
b. Percent of GDP.
c. Year over year, percent.
d. CPI-based, 2000 = 100.
e. Billions of dollars.
12178-05a_Blanchard_rev1.qxd  8/11/10  12:16 PM  Page 297$480 billion, equivalent to 36 percent of GDP. Total foreign debt was
$464 billion, of which $114 billion reﬂected loans to banks, $42.6 billion
foreign deposits in banks, and $210 billion loans to households and ﬁrms.
Of this debt, $361 billion was denominated in foreign currency, and
$100 billion was short-term debt.
With a large current account surplus, a large ﬁscal surplus, a smoothing
mechanism against oil price ﬂuctuations, nearly no public debt, and a ratio
of reserves to short-term debt equal to over 480 percent, one would have
expected Russia to manage the crisis well. This was not the case.
The trade shock was severe. The dominant channel was not so much the
decrease in export volumes as the decrease in oil prices, which fell from
$138 per barrel in July 2008 to $44 per barrel in early 2009. The terms of
trade for Russia’s overall commodity exports, which accounted for a very
large 22 percent of GDP, fell 36 percent during the crisis semester relative
to the previous semester. The decline in our terms of trade variable was the
third largest in our sample, exceeded by only Venezuela and Chile. The
interesting question is whether, given the presence of stabilization funds,
the terms of trade decrease had a large adverse effect on demand. Put
another way, given that most of Russia’s oil revenue goes to the state, was
the decline in revenue reﬂected in ﬁscal tightening? The answer is not obvi-
ous. The increase in the ﬁscal deﬁcit in 2008Q4 far exceeded the decrease
in oil revenue. But this increase was followed by a sharp decrease in the
deﬁcit in 2009Q1, while oil revenue was decreasing further. This would
suggest a positive effect on demand in 2008Q4 but a strongly adverse
effect in 2009Q1, which could help explain the large decline in output in
that quarter. What complicates the matter is that Russia typically experi-
ences large ﬁscal deﬁcits in the fourth quarter for seasonal reasons. Thus,
the relevant question is whether the deﬁcit was larger than expected, and
this we cannot answer. A strong ﬁscal stimulus program was put in place
in April 2009, too late to have an effect on the period under consideration.
The post-Lehman ﬁnancial shock was not the ﬁrst such shock experi-
enced by Russia in 2008. The ﬁrst, triggered by the war with Georgia,
came in August: large portfolio withdrawals led to a 22 percent decline in
the stock market from the start of the war in early August to just before
the collapse of Lehman and gross outﬂows of $20 billion. The same hap-
pened after Lehman: the stock market declined by 17 percent in two days,
after which the Russian authorities closed it for two days.
The initial reaction of the Russian central bank was twofold. First, it
sought to use reserves to limit the size of the depreciation and avoid balance
sheet effects. (Figure 12 shows the path of reserves and of the exchange
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liquidity to banks, through a decrease in reserve requirements, the provi-
sion of uncollateralized loans to a larger set of banks, and the provision of
$50 billion to the large state bank, VEB, to help ﬁrms repay their external
debt. More exotic measures were taken as well, such as the allocation of
roughly $5 billion from the National Reserve Fund to buy shares, in order to
increase the value of the collateral (often their own shares) posted by ﬁrms.
Despite these measures, outflows continued at a rapid pace, and the
Russian central bank steadily lost reserves: $25 billion in September,
$72 billion in October, $29 billion in November, and $29 billion in
December. (Table 7 reports the current account, the ﬁnancial account, and
reserves as averages for 2005–07 and for each quarter from 2008Q1 to
2009Q1.) Why were outﬂows so large? For the most part, because investors
perceived that the rate of loss in reserves was too high to be sustained, and
thus anticipated a larger depreciation to come. Domestic ﬁrms repaid their
dollar loans. Domestic depositors shifted from ruble to dollar accounts;
the share of foreign currency–denominated bank deposits increased from
14 percent in September to 27 percent in December. Domestic banks
shifted from making domestic loans to buying dollar assets, in amounts
beyond what was needed to hedge the change in the currency structure of
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Figure 12. Russia: Reserves and the Exchange Rate
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Bloomberg L.P.
a. Daily data, inverted scale.
























12178-05a_Blanchard_rev1.qxd  8/11/10  12:16 PM  Page 299their liabilities. (In view of the expected depreciation, the demand for dol-
lar loans was obviously low.) By mid-November the Russian central bank
decided to widen the exchange rate band and allow for a faster deprecia-
tion. The ruble was devalued by about 20 percent in January 2009, largely
ending the net outﬂows and reserve losses.
By then, however, it was too late to avoid an output decline. Despite the
provision of liquidity, doubts about solvency had increased the interbank
rate from 4 percent in July 2008 to 16 percent in January 2009. Over the
same period, the shift by banks from domestic loans to dollar assets was
reﬂected in an increase in the average interest rate charged to ﬁrms from
11 percent in July 2008 to 17 percent. Credit to households, which had
grown by 3 percent monthly from January to September 2008, remained
ﬂat for the rest of the year and then decreased by 1 percent monthly from
January 2009 on. Credit to ﬁrms, which had grown by 2.6 percent monthly
from January to September 2008, actually increased further to 3.5 percent
monthly from October to January, in some measure because of govern-
ment pressure on state banks to increase credit, as well as a strong desire of
ﬁrms to replace dollar debt with ruble debt. It then remained ﬂat from Jan-
uary on, in part because ﬁrms began to repay debt they had assumed during
the crisis, as the ruble began to appreciate.
In short, Russia was affected by two shocks, a terms of trade shock and
a ﬁnancial shock. One might have hoped that the existence of the stabiliza-
tion funds for oil would limit the adverse effects on demand of the decrease
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Table 7. Russia: Current Account, Capital Flows, and Reserves, 2005–09
Billions of dollars
Average, 2008 2008 2008 2008 2009
Indicator 2005–07 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
Exports of goods and services
a 364.0 136.0 156.9 167.2 121.9 74.4
Imports of goods and services
a −276.5 −97.2 −130.6 −136.5 −112.2 −64.7
Current account balance
b 85.4 38.0 26.2 29.7 8.5 9.3
Net bank ﬂows 20.5 −11.3 22.1 −13.2 −51.4 0.5
Net nonbank financial flows 12.5 −14.2 12.8 3.5 −84.4 −32.7
Financial account balance
c 33.0 −25.6 34.9 −9.8 −135.9 −32.2
Exceptional ﬁnancing from  −1.2
IMF
Change in reserves
d 71.4 6.4 64.2 15.0 −131.1 −30.5
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.
a. Includes factor income ﬂows.
b. Includes transfers.
c. Excludes changes in reserves and ofﬁcial (IMF) ﬁnancing.
d. Differs from the sum of the current account balance, the ﬁnancial account balance, and ofﬁcial
ﬁnancing due to errors and omissions (not shown).
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low debt positions would limit the effects of the ﬁnancial shocks. This was
not the case, and the story has an interesting twist: the problems did not
come so much from capital outﬂows by foreign investors as from a shift
by domestic residents—households, ﬁrms, and banks—out of ruble and
into dollar assets. In this sense Russia may be the country that most corre-
sponds to the case considered by Maurice Obstfeld, Alan Taylor, and Jay
Shambaugh (2010), who argue that the variable to which reserves should
be compared is not short-term debt, but rather total liquid assets held by
domestic residents. At the start of the crisis, short-term debt in Russia was
about $100 billion, but M2 was about $430 billion, much closer to the
number for reserves. Given the ease with which domestic residents could
shift into dollar assets, this may be why it was rational to expect a depreci-
ation, and the equilibrium was self-fulﬁlling.
Russia’s experience also exempliﬁes the dangers of pegging (or, more
accurately, of sharply limiting the decline in the currency) when other
actors expect the policy to come to an end and the currency to depreciate.
One can question whether, ex ante, Russia’s policy was mistaken. Ex ante,
it was plausible that the crisis would come to an end sooner, that oil prices
would recover, and that reserves would prove more than sufﬁcient. Also
(and this is the other side of the same coin), the controlled depreciation
allowed ﬁrms to decrease their foreign currency exposure and thus suffer
smaller balance sheet effects when the depreciation actually came. One
can also ask whether a Federal Reserve swap line like those extended to
Mexico, Korea, and Brazil would have allowed Russia to credibly main-
tain its exchange rate and reduce its capital outﬂows.
III.C. Chile and the Role of Institutions
Like Russia, Chile depends very much on commodity exports—in
Chile’s case, copper—and is ﬁnancially open. Yet it suffered a relatively
small decline in output: −10 percent in 2008Q4 and −4 percent in 2009Q1
(again at annual rates). The question this time is why the decline was so
modest.
Chile entered the crisis in strong macroeconomic shape. From 2005 to
2007 growth was steady, averaging 4.5 percent per year. This performance
reﬂected in part Chile’s strong dependence on copper—copper exports
were 23 percent of GDP in 2007—and the doubling of the price of copper
between 2005 and 2007. Strong copper exports led to large trade and cur-
rent account surpluses. Inﬂation was stable, at least until 2008 when it
started to increase, leading to a steady increase in the policy interest rate
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some basic macroeconomic numbers for Chile.)
The country’s balance sheets, both public and private, were strong. The
effects of copper prices on the fiscal balance, and thus on aggregate
demand, were smoothed by a ﬁscal rule setting annual spending in line with
medium-term revenue, including copper revenue, under a conservative cop-
per price assumption. The surplus was accumulated in a stabilization fund,
which by 2007 had accumulated $15 billion. (GDP that year was $164 bil-
lion.) Public debt, including debt of public enterprises, was a low 24 per-
cent of GDP. For 2007 the primary balance showed a surplus of 8.8 percent
of GDP, 0.2 percent excluding mining. Private foreign debt, owed mostly
by individuals and ﬁrms rather than banks, was $56 billion. The banking
sector was heavily regulated and strong, reﬂecting lessons learned in ear-
lier banking crises. Subsidiaries of foreign banks accounted for roughly
half of total bank assets. Central bank reserves were $24 billion, roughly
75 percent of the country’s short-term debt. (Beginning in April 2008, in
the face of higher global risk, the central bank had started a reserve accu-
mulation program. By the time the program ended in September, it had
accumulated $5.75 billion.)
The main effect of the crisis was through the trade channel. The crisis
was associated with a decrease in exports but also, and more important,
with a sharp decline in the price of copper. The decline in our terms of
trade measure for Chile was the second largest of the countries in our sam-
ple (after Venezuela), and only marginally larger than Russia’s. Given the
country’s ﬁscal rule, the effect on disposable income and demand was lim-
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Table 8. Chile: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators, 2005–09
Average, 2008 2008 2008 2008 2009
Indicator 2005–07 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
GDP growth
a 4.5 6.7 6.5 −1.4 −9.8 −4.3
Current account
b 3.5 0.5 0.4 −4.5 −5.7 0.0
Consumer price inﬂation
c 3.6 8.0 9.0 9.3 8.5 5.9
Real effective exchange rate
d 93.8 102.9 100.3 94.0 85.2 91.4
Stock market capitalization
e 178.0 241.4 200.8 177.7 132.7 149.7
Change in stock market 21.1 15.1 −15.7 −22.8 −41.3 −38.0
capitalization
c
Sources: IMF, Global Data Source and International Financial Statistics; Santiago Stock Exchange.
a. Quarter over quarter, seasonally adjusted at an annual rate, percent.
b. Percent of GDP.
c. Year over year, percent.
d. CPI-based, 2000 = 100.
e. Billions of dollars.
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mulations of the stabilization fund, from $3 billion in 2008Q1 to $1 billion
in 2008Q4. In 2009Q1 the government put in place an additional fiscal
stimulus program of $4 billion; ﬁnancing needs increased further later in
the year by another $4 billion.
On the ﬁnancial side, what is most striking is that net capital ﬂows
actually remained positive in both 2008Q4 and 2009Q1. (Table 9 reports
the current account, the ﬁnancial account, and reserves as averages for
2005–07 and for each quarter from 2008Q1 to 2009Q1.) Thus, despite a
sharp decrease in the current account balance, the decrease in reserves was
small—$1 billion in 2008Q4, followed by an increase of $0.5 billion in
2009Q1—and associated with a moderate depreciation: the real exchange
rate index fell from 100 in 2008Q2 to 85 in 2008Q4 and then recovered to
91 in 2009Q1.
This behavior of reserves and the exchange rate was probably due to
two main factors. The ﬁrst was the central bank’s decision to allow the
exchange rate to adjust rather than to use the policy interest rate or to rely
on reserve decumulation. Only in January 2009, after inﬂation had sub-
stantially declined, was the policy rate lowered, by almost 500 basis points
between January and March 2009. Starting at the end of September, the
central bank made some dollar liquidity available to banks, but at a fairly
large spread (300 basis points initially) over LIBOR.
The second factor was the behavior of gross capital ﬂows. Gross out-
ﬂows were only marginally higher during the two quarters of the crisis
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Table 9. Chile: Current Account, Capital Flows, and Reserves, 2005–09
Billions of dollars
Average, 2008 2008 2008 2008 2009
Indicator 2005–07 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
Exports of goods and services
a 67.9 23.5 22.7 20.7 16.4 15.1
Imports of goods and services
a −65.4 −22.6 −23.9 −24.3 −19.0 −14.5
Current account balance
b 5.3 1.5 0.1 −2.9 −2.1 0.9
Net bank ﬂows 0.2 1.6 1.2 0.1 −1.1 −2.1
Net nonbank ﬁnancial ﬂows −4.1 −1.1 1.0 7.5 2.8 2.9
Financial account balance
c −3.9 0.5 2.2 7.6 1.7 0.8
Change in reserves
d 1.2 0.4 2.4 4.6 −0.9 0.5
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics.
a. Includes factor income ﬂows.
b. Includes transfers.
c. Excludes changes in reserves and ofﬁcial (IMF) ﬁnancing.
d. Differs from the sum of the current account balance, the ﬁnancial account balance, and ofﬁcial ﬁnanc-
ing due to errors and omissions (not shown).
12178-05a_Blanchard_rev1.qxd  8/11/10  12:16 PM  Page 303than before. Interestingly, gross inﬂows increased even more. These inﬂows
came not only from the repatriation of funds by pension funds but also,
indeed to a larger extent, from domestic ﬁrms and households. This is in
sharp contrast to what happened, for example, in Russia, where capital out-
ﬂows by foreign investors led to capital outﬂows by domestic residents.
How much was due to the decision to let the peso depreciate (in contrast
with Russia, which tried to maintain a peg despite the anticipation by
investors of a future devaluation) and how much was due to the perception
of Chile as a relatively safe ﬁnancial haven is difﬁcult to assess. The result,
in any case, was only a small loss in reserves and a moderate depreciation.
Nevertheless, the trade shocks and the ﬁnancial crisis had some effect
on the real economy. The stock market fell by almost 15 percent from Sep-
tember to December, a small decrease relative to other emerging market
countries. And although the interbank rate rose little relative to the policy
rate, there was an increase in lending rates of roughly 4 percentage points
from September to December, at a time when, in addition, inﬂation was
falling, implying a larger increase in real interest rates.
The overall result was a decrease in demand and in output, but on a more
limited scale than in many other countries. The ﬁscal rule, the framework
for smoothing the effect of copper revenue, a strong ﬁnancial sector, lim-
ited foreign currency exposure, and the decision early on to let the peso
depreciate probably all played a role in the outcome.
IV. Conclusions
One can read the three preceding sections as ﬁrst building the bone structure
and progressively adding the ﬂesh. The model presented in section I has
allowed us to identify and analyze the effects of the main two shocks that
affected emerging market countries during the crisis: a sharp decrease in
exports (together with a sharp decrease in the terms of trade for commod-
ity producers), and a sharp increase in capital outflows. It showed the
dependence of the unexpected output losses on initial conditions, in partic-
ular on foreign debt. It showed the complexity of the decisions policymak-
ers faced in this environment, and the effects of using the policy interest
rate, the exchange rate, reserve decumulation, and ﬁscal policy.
The econometrics in section II provided a ﬁrst pass at the data. Despite
the limitations inherent in using a cross-sectional dataset with only 29
observations, our empirical analysis yielded strong evidence that both the
trade and the ﬁnancial channel played important roles. The differing effects
of the shocks across countries, coming from different trade and ﬁnancial
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partners, explain much of the heterogeneity of growth performances dur-
ing the crisis. When it comes to policy, our most interesting findings are
two “nonresults.” Countries with fixed exchange rate regimes fared, on
average, much worse. However, when we control for other factors, in par-
ticular short-term debt, the direct effect of ﬁxed exchange rates largely dis-
appears. This ﬁnding is consistent with the ambiguous effect of exchange
rates in our model: the outcome depends on the strength of expenditure
switching and balance sheet effects. We did not ﬁnd compelling economet-
ric evidence that international reserves were important buffers in the crisis.
The case studies give a better sense of the many factors that shaped the
effects of the crisis in each country, which cannot be captured by econo-
metrics alone. The comparison between Russia and Chile is perhaps the
most interesting. Both countries are large commodity producers, and both
were hit by a large adverse trade shock. Both were ﬁnancially open. Russia
had larger reserves relative to its short-term debt than Chile. Yet Chile was
much less affected by the crisis than Russia. The proximate reasons for
Chile’s relative success are probably twofold. First, Chile used its ﬁscal sta-
bilization mechanisms more effectively than Russia did. Second, whereas
Chile experienced small capital outﬂows by foreigners and more than off-
setting capital inﬂows by domestic residents, Russia suffered large capital
outﬂows by both foreigners and domestic residents. The deeper reasons for
these differences in capital ﬂows are probably the greater conﬁdence in the
macroﬁnancial structure in Chile than in Russia, and Chile’s decision early
on to let its currency depreciate, which compares favorably with Russia’s
initial decision, eventually abandoned, to maintain the parity, giving rise to
speculative outﬂows.
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Comments and Discussion
COMMENT BY
KRISTIN J. FORBES This paper by Olivier Blanchard, Mitali Das, and
Hamid Faruqee asks a well-deﬁned and extremely important question: how
did the recent crisis affect emerging markets in late 2008 and early 2009?
The answer has critical policy implications both for emerging markets
and for the international ﬁnancial institutions. To answer this question, the
paper begins with an intuitive model that clearly lays out the main chan-
nels by which the crisis could affect emerging markets, and the effects of
different policy responses. Then it reports a series of regressions to test
the role of various channels in explaining the spread of the crisis, focusing
on the role of trade versus that of ﬁnance and the impact of macroeconomic
policies. The paper closes with several case studies, which provide impor-
tant detail on the cross-country regression results—and show the challenges
in generalizing about emerging market experiences during the crisis.
This paper should be required reading for anyone attempting to under-
stand how emerging markets were affected during the peak of the crisis. It
is straightforward to read and understand and does an excellent job of
articulating a model to frame the issues and then evaluating the predictions
of the model through cross-country analysis and more in-depth country
studies. Both approaches clearly beneﬁt from the authors’ mix of academic
knowledge and real-world experience. The regression analysis carefully
tests a variety of alternative hypotheses and measures, and the results
are surprisingly strong given the limited degrees of freedom available. The
most robust ﬁndings are that the crisis spread to emerging markets through
both the trade and the financial channels, but with a more important role
for ﬁnance, as measured by countries’ exposure to short-term external debt.
This result is logical and supports anecdotal evidence gathered during the
crisis as well as the more detailed analysis in the case studies. The results
12178-05b_Blanchard comments_rev1.qxd  8/11/10  12:17 PM  Page 308also suggest that neither exchange rates nor reserve accumulation had much
of a direct effect in determining how the crisis affected emerging markets.
These results have important policy implications.
The authors have also done an impressive job in addressing many of
the concerns that were raised when they presented a draft of this paper 
at the Brookings Papers conference. My comments will therefore focus
on only four issues: the dependent variable, the sample size, omitted vari-
ables, and the assumptions about capital flows. These issues are not new
to the authors—indeed, they are very candid about the limitations of their
data and analysis.
Let me begin by highlighting one important innovation that was already
present in the conference version and has been further improved in this
version. The earlier version did not focus on explaining growth in emerg-
ing markets during the whole of 2008 or 2009, although this is the standard
measure used in other, related papers and would have been straightforward
to measure. Instead it attempted to explain the difference between growth
during the peak semester of the crisis (2008Q4 and 2009Q1) and trend
growth (average growth from 1995 through 2007).
This measure of the dependent variable was better than that used in
other work, not only because it focused on the change in growth versus the
trend, but also because it focused on growth during the peak of the crisis
rather than over an entire year. Growth in many countries was strong both
at the start of 2008 and at the end of 2009, so that focusing on annual
growth could have missed the full impact of the crisis. This measure, how-
ever, still had the shortcoming of overstating the impact of the crisis on
countries that were already expected to have slower growth in 2008Q4 or
2009Q1 for reasons unrelated to the crisis. (For example, annual growth in
Latvia was already expected to slow from a trend rate of 8.8 percent from
2000 to 2007 to 3.6 percent in 2008, before any effect of the crisis, accord-
ing to IMF data.) The published version of the paper adjusts for this by
focusing on “unexpected growth”—the forecast error for output growth
during the 2008Q4–2009Q1 semester—instead of growth versus trend.
This choice of measure should more accurately capture how the crisis
changed growth in these countries, which is the key variable of interest.
One challenge resulting from this choice of measure of the growth
shock, however, is that the available data are limited. Quarterly growth
data are not available for many emerging markets and other developing
countries, and several of the remaining countries lack the necessary fore-
cast data, so the main regressions have a maximum of 29 observations.
Many emerging markets are omitted from the sample, such as Bahrain,
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El Salvador, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan,
Romania, Singapore, Uruguay, and Vietnam. Moreover, the sample is
dominated by countries in Eastern Europe—just over one-third of the sam-
ple is from this region. In comparison, more traditional emerging market
samples that do not rely on quarterly data generally have less than 20 per-
cent of the sample from Eastern Europe. Moreover, this unbalanced sample
is not random, because the overrepresentation of Eastern Europe results
from requirements on EU members to report quarterly data.
The authors are candid about this shortcoming with the sample size and
careful not to ask too much of the data, given the limited degrees of free-
dom. Nonetheless, the small sample raises questions about whether the
results are driven by outliers or by patterns in Eastern Europe or other
small groups of countries that may not apply to the full set of countries.
My table 1 reports several tests to see whether this is important. I focus on
the main regression results in column 1-2 of the authors’ table 1, in which
the trade channel is measured by unexpected growth in trading partners
and the financial channel by short-term external debt. The first column
in my table replicates the results in the paper. The second column clusters
errors by region—which, one could argue, is the preferred method of esti-
mation. This increases the signiﬁcance of the trade variable, and the ﬁnan-
cial variable remains significant. The next column then drops Eastern
310 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
Table 1. Regressions Explaining GDP Growth in Emerging Market Countriesa
Full sample
Sample Sample
Errors Errors omits omits Estonia,
not clustered by Eastern Latvia, and
Independent variable clustered region
b Europe
c  Lithuania
Unexpected growth in 0.732*  0.732** 0.783 0.659*
partner countries (0.374) (0.184) (0.454) (0.371)
Short-term external debt −0.279** −0.279** −0.463  −0.265* 
(0.044) (0.041) (0.322) (0.135)
No. of observations 29 29 19 26
Adjusted R
2 0.46 0.46 0.24 0.21
Source: Author’s regressions.
a. The dependent variable is unexpected GDP growth in 2008Q4 and 2009Q1, deﬁned as the difference
between actual growth and the International Monetary Fund’s April 2008 forecast; all growth rates are
annualized. Except where stated otherwise, the sample consists of the 29 countries included in the main
regressions in Blanchard, Das, and Faruqee (this volume). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the *10 percent and the **5 percent level.
b. Regions are Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America, and other.
c. The omitted countries are Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Serbia, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
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cial variables are now insigniﬁcant. This suggests that patterns in Eastern
Europe may be driving the results, but because the sample size is now so
small, it may be too much to expect statistically significant results. To
maintain a larger sample and some representation of Eastern Europe, the
last column drops just three countries—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—
that appear to be outliers when residuals are plotted. Now the coefﬁcients
on partner growth and short-term debt are both borderline signiﬁcant (at the
10 percent level), suggesting that these three countries in Eastern Europe
may be important in driving the results.
This series of results suggests that it may be worth expanding the sam-
ple size to ensure that the results are not driven by a small subset of coun-
tries or by the specific characteristics of Eastern Europe. Of course, this
is much easier said than done. One solution would be to continue using
quarterly growth data, but to add countries that are traditionally classi-
fied as developed even though they share some characteristics with
countries in the emerging market sample. For example, why not include
Greece, Iceland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain? Income per capita in each of
these countries is about the same as in Israel, Slovenia, or Taiwan—all of
which are in the sample and are generally classified as emerging mar-
kets. The challenge in including these Western European countries may
be political, in the sense that they might not appreciate being classified
as “emerging markets”—especially by a group of authors from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund.
A related issue to consider when interpreting the results is the possibil-
ity of omitted variables. The literature on contagion suggests a number of
other mechanisms by which the crisis could have affected emerging mar-
kets (see Claessens, Dornbusch, and Park 2001). For example, the paper
interprets the signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient on short-term debt as show-
ing the importance of the ﬁnancial channel in spreading the crisis. But is
there an omitted variable, correlated with short-term debt, that actually 
drives this relationship? For example, are countries that are riskier and
more vulnerable more likely to have higher short-term debt ratios? Proba-
bly. And wouldn’t these more risky and vulnerable countries be more
likely to experience a large growth slowdown during the crisis as risk aver-
sion increases—independent of their share of short-term debt? Similarly,
other work on contagion has discussed how trade can spread crises through
different effects, for example by affecting import demand and competitive-
ness (see Forbes 2004). The paper tests its measures of the trade channel
individually, but it should test them simultaneously along with the various
COMMENTS and DISCUSSION 311
12178-05b_Blanchard comments_rev1.qxd  8/11/10  12:18 PM  Page 311financial measures. Of course, the challenge in controlling for many of
these factors simultaneously is again the small sample size, which again
underscores the importance of extending the sample to more countries.
My ﬁnal comment relates to the authors’ model and its relationship to
the empirical results. In the model, net capital inﬂows depend on the EMBI
spread adjusted for a risk premium and home bias. A key assumption is
that an increase in perceived risk or an increase in home bias causes
investors and ﬁnancial institutions in developed countries to reduce their
foreign lending and thereby reduce net capital ﬂows to emerging markets.
This assumption is critical for the analysis. The reduction in net capital
ﬂows that results from an increase in home bias (assuming a given policy
rate and unchanged reserves) reduces the trade balance, causes the home
currency to depreciate, and lowers output. The model yields similar results
if there is an increase in risk aversion: net capital ﬂows and output again
decline, although the effect on the exchange rate is ambiguous.
But how valid is the assumption that when the crisis hits, the result 
is necessarily to reduce net capital flows? This has been the standard
assumption in a large literature on “sudden stops,” which argues that dur-
ing crises, capital flows to emerging markets suddenly cease (see Calvo
1998). But there has been little formal testing of this hypothesis. The
authors deserve credit for at least mentioning that this assumption may
not hold in all cases, although they leave exploring the ramifications for
the model and the empirical analysis for future work. Moreover, the case
study on Chile provides a clear example of an emerging market where
this assumption does not hold—a great example of the benefits of doing
detailed case studies.
But is this pattern of increasing rather than decreasing net capital
inﬂows unique to the Chilean experience, or is it a broader phenomenon?
My ﬁgure 1 shows gross capital inﬂows and outﬂows and the resulting net
capital ﬂows for the United States during the crisis. (I focus on the United
States because data distinguishing gross ﬂows by domestic from those by
foreign investors are readily available.) The ﬁgure shows that gross capital
inﬂows from foreigners fell in late 2008. At the same time, however, gross
capital outﬂows by domestic investors were negative, suggesting that they
brought home large amounts of capital previously invested abroad. As a
result, net capital ﬂows into the United States actually increased during
this period. Granted, the United States is not an ideal comparator, as it is a
developed country with large and liquid capital markets, which may have
become relatively more attractive to investors during the crisis. The exam-
ple does show, however, that changes in investment by domestic residents
312 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
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instead of a net decrease in capital ﬂows during a crisis.
Do any countries other than the United States and Chile exhibit this pat-
tern? As a rough test, I examine a group of 101 countries to see whether net
capital ﬂows in 2008Q4 were larger or smaller than in 2007Q4.
1 Table 2
shows that in the full sample, net capital ﬂows increased in 45 countries but
decreased in 56. Many of the countries in which capital inﬂows increased,
however, are developed countries. The last row of the table therefore looks
at the patterns for emerging markets only; it shows that emerging markets
were more likely to see a decrease in net capital ﬂows than an increase dur-
ing the crisis. This “sudden stop” is apparent in many of the major emerging
markets, including Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Poland, Russia, South Africa,
and Turkey. But the table also shows that the pattern of increasing instead
of decreasing net capital inﬂows is not unique to Chile among developing
countries. In fact, even many countries in the authors’ sample—including
Colombia, the Czech Republic, Israel, Mexico, and Thailand—experienced
a net increase in net capital ﬂows in 2008Q4 over 2007Q4, contradicting
their model’s key assumption.
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1. The sample includes all countries for which data were available. I focus only on the
fourth quarter because, as of this writing, data for 2009Q1 are not as widely available, and
only by comparing similar quarters can one control for seasonal effects that can signiﬁcantly
affect capital ﬂows.
Figure 1. United States: Capital Inﬂows and Outﬂows, 1970–2008
Trillions of dollars
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for a number of countries, many of its key predictions might not apply
to this subset of countries. For example, for countries with net capital
inflows during the peak of the crisis, the financial channel would not be
expected to have as large an effect. To test this, it would be straightfor-
ward to repeat the main regression analysis but split the sample into two
groups: those with net capital inflows (or at least not large outflows),
and those with large net capital outflows. Given the small sample size,
this would certainly be pushing the degrees of freedom, but it could
show very different effects of the crisis for these two subsamples of
emerging markets.
To conclude, this paper addresses a very important question: how did
the crisis spread to emerging markets? It does an excellent job of laying
out the key issues and testing several different hypotheses. It takes pains
to evaluate several different theories but is challenged by the very stark
limitations of the data—especially the small sample size, which makes it
difficult to control for various effects and relationships simultaneously.
Nonetheless, the empirical results seem fairly robust, especially given
the limitations of the exercise, suggesting that financial mechanisms
were likely the most important factor in transmitting the crisis to emerg-
ing markets during late 2008 and early 2009. Although this paper may
not be the last word on the issue, it presents convincing evidence on
how the crisis spread and should provide an excellent resource for any-
one seeking to understand why a crisis that started in the U.S. subprime
housing market had such virulent effects in emerging markets around
the world.
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Full sample 45 56
Developed countries 14 7
Emerging markets 31 49
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
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COMMENT BY
LINDA L. TESAR
1 The U.S. recession that began in late 2007 had
signiﬁcant spillover effects on the rest of the globe. This paper by Olivier
Blanchard, Mitali Das, and Hamid Faruqee studies the impact of the U.S.
ﬁnancial crisis and the accompanying economic contraction on 29 emerg-
ing market countries in South America, the Middle East, Eastern Europe,
and Asia. As figure 2 of the paper shows, the contraction experienced by
emerging markets over the interval 2008Q4–2009Q1 was far from uniform.
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Russia experienced “unexpected” economic
growth rates (the difference between actual growth and the April 2008 IMF
forecast) on the order of negative 25 percent, while Poland, Venezuela,
and China experienced only mild declines. The objective of this paper is to
explain the heterogeneity in these negative growth rates. In particular, the
paper seeks to isolate which of two channels of transmission—openness to
trade and openness to capital ﬂows—is the more signiﬁcant in accounting
for cross-country differences in growth rates during the crisis.
This is a thought-provoking paper on an important and timely issue. It
is well written and clear in its objective and in presenting its findings.
The paper begins with a simple model of a small, open economy that
trades with the rest of the world and has access to international credit
markets. The model is a highly stylized IS-LM framework—one that
abstracts from dynamics, expectations, and uncertainty—that the authors
use to perform simple comparative static exercises. In this framework, a
decrease in demand for a country’s exports or a shift away from its assets
will contract the aggregate budget constraint and, conditional on endoge-
nous shifts in the exchange rate or adjustments in fiscal policy, will lead
to a contraction in output.
The model motivates the regressions that are the core of the paper. In
essence, the authors run a horserace between various measures of openness
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GDP growth rates in emerging markets during the two quarters of interest.
The overall conclusion is that both channels played a role in global trans-
mission, although the financial channel dominates in terms of statistical
significance and magnitude. Using the authors’ data, I was able to verify
that the core results are robust to changes in the speciﬁcation of right-hand-
side variables, sample selection, and other factors. My comments therefore
focus largely on the interpretation of the results and whether the takeaway
from this paper is really as straightforward as the authors suggest.
THE THOUGHT EXPERIMENT. The premise of the paper is that emerging
markets were the victims of a collapse in global demand for their goods and
for their ﬁnancial assets. The shock that hit emerging markets is assumed to
be both external to the countries in the sample and common to all of them.
The baseline regression implied by this thought experiment is a simple
one: the dependent variable is unexpected growth in GDP in each country,
and the independent variables include measures of each country’s “expo-
sure” to the shock: for example, trade as a share of GDP as a measure of
the trade channel, and exposure to short-term debt for the financial chan-
nel. Other right-hand-side variables are tested, and in general, the ﬁnancial
variables come in signiﬁcant and dominate the trade variables.
Of course, to conclude that the ﬁnancial channel beats the trade channel,
or even that the ﬁnancial channel results are economically meaningful, one
has to impose the all-else-equal assumption. As is clear even in this simple
open economy model, the transformation of a fall in foreign demand for a
country’s exports or its assets into a contraction in output depends on a
number of auxiliary assumptions about the structure of the economy. If
countries differ in the strength of their ﬁnancial institutions, in the degree
of adjustment in goods prices or the exchange rate, or in elasticities of
substitution between home and foreign goods and between home and for-
eign assets, to list just a few possibilities, the coefﬁcients on the “trade”
and the “ﬁnance” effects will differ across countries. In addition, there may
be endogenous policy responses to the shock, which would mitigate its
effects. Indeed, the bigger the exposure to the shock, the more likely other
variables such as prices will adjust, and the more likely governments will
react. What is effectively being estimated is the net effect of the shock on
output, which results from a complicated mix of structural differences
across countries and heterogeneous policy responses to shocks.
One could, in principle, control for some of these differences in order to
isolate the “pure” trade and ﬁnance channels. The authors are well aware
of the nature of the problem, and in a sense the model itself exposes the
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regressions to try to address the issue, but one can only do so much in a
regression with 29 observations. Therefore, the results should be viewed as
a set of correlations between changes in output and external balances and
not as a set of causal relationships.
AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION. An alternative to the emerging-markets-
as-victims scenario is that emerging markets, to a greater or lesser degree,
rode the same credit boom that fueled the U.S. crisis. Low global inter-
est rates, innovations in the banking sector, and rising real estate prices
resulted in an easing of credit and a boom in both private and public expen-
diture in many countries. In this scenario the contraction in the second half
of 2008 was triggered not so much by a collapse in global demand as by
the global realization that the party was coming to an end.
The paper’s description of the sequence of events in Latvia in 2007
and  2008 casts doubt on the emerging-markets-as-victims hypothesis.
The case study of the Latvian crisis notes that “the right starting point is
not the start of the crisis itself, but the boom that the economy experi-
enced in the 2000s.” Stock prices and real estate prices in Latvia soared in
the mid-2000s, and despite rising domestic goods and services prices,
the country maintained its peg to the euro. Access to credit, with real
estate as collateral, resulted in high rates of consumption and invest-
ment growth. By early 2007, the paper notes, “signs of overheating and of
an impending bust were starting to become apparent.” In early 2008 GDP
growth turned negative and asset prices began to fall—all of this well
before the external shocks of mid-2008.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Latvian ﬁnancial sector increasingly had to
shift to shorter lines of credit. Figure 10 of the paper shows that Latvia had
the highest ratio of short-term external debt to GDP of any emerging market
in the sample in 2007. This raises an important issue for the regression
analysis. It is well known that as credit conditions tighten and risk assess-
ments deteriorate, countries may become unable to borrow at long maturi-
ties. Short-term debt is then no longer an exogenous variable revealing a
country’s exposure to external credit market conditions, but an endogenous
measure of its own creditworthiness. It is not clear then whether the correct
speciﬁcation is a regression of output growth on short-term debt or the other
way around. Again, absent a more complete structural model and the impo-
sition of plausible identifying assumptions, the best one can do is conclude
that the two variables are correlated.
The Latvian case also suggests that in order to separate the “victim of
external shocks” scenario from the “we got into the same trouble ourselves”
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dynamics leading up to the contraction, or look carefully at the timing of the
output collapse, or both. The collection of more country-speciﬁc informa-
tion is beyond the scope of this paper, and certainly beyond the scope of this
discussion. However, it is fairly easy to look at the patterns in output in the
period preceding that studied in the paper.
I show in ﬁgure 1 GDP growth rates for 27 emerging market countries
over two intervals: 2007Q4–2008Q1 and 2008Q4–2009Q1, the former
being the semester one year before that on which the paper focuses, 
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Figure 1. GDP Growth in 27 Emerging Market Countries, 2007Q4–2008Q1 and
2008Q4–2009Q1
Source: Author’s calculations using International Monetary Fund data.
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growth in GDP in the latter period, calculated using GDP volume data
from the IMF. This differs a little from the dependent variable in the paper,
which is the estimated deviation from the April 2008 IMF forecast. How-
ever, the variable used in the regressions and the GDP growth rates calcu-
lated here have a correlation coefficient of 0.73, so the message here
should not be affected by the use of slightly different data. (The results of
the basic regressions in the paper can also be replicated quite closely using
GDP volume data rather than the deviations-from-forecast series.)
The ﬁgure suggests that the cross section of growth rates in the second
semester of 2007 is highly correlated with the cross section of growth rates
in 2008. In fact, the two sets of growth rates have a correlation coefﬁcient
of 0.93. This means that the countries with weak economic performance in
the last half of 2008, after experiencing the “external shock,” were the
same set of countries with weak performance in the last half of 2007,
before the shock. Growth rates across the board were certainly lower in the
latter half of 2008 than in the latter half of 2007. But what the paper seeks
to explain is the cross-sectional distribution of GDP growth—why some
countries fared so much worse than others—not why some countries have
persistently low growth rates. If this distribution is the same before and
after the shock, then it appears that one should be looking for longer-run
reasons for differences in growth rates across countries and not the dif-
ferential impact of a shock speciﬁc to the end of 2008.
Indeed, when the baseline regression is run including the growth rate
for the second semester of 2007 as a control, both the trade and the ﬁnan-
cial variables lose their signiﬁcance. Depending on the speciﬁcation, some
appear with the opposite sign. I am not suggesting that this is the most
appropriate test—a test symmetric to those in the paper would use the devia-
tion of growth in 2007 from the forecast, and there are serious problems of
endogeneity in my regression. However, the fact that the regression is not
robust to including growth in 2007, together with the very high persistence
of growth rates, casts doubt on the empirical evidence that either the trade
or the ﬁnancial channel is the primary explanation for the cross-sectional
distribution of growth in emerging markets in the latter half of 2008.
Now, setting the empirical evidence in this paper aside, do I believe
that emerging markets were affected by their openness to global markets?
Absolutely. But I also believe that those economies beneﬁted from access to
those markets in the period leading up to the crisis. The challenge remains
what it was in the aftermath of previous emerging market crises: to develop
models capable of explaining the dynamics before, during, and after the
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can help countries manage their exposure, in good times and in bad.
GENERAL DISCUSSION George von Furstenberg raised three points.
First, with respect to the specification of the risk premium, severe posi-
tive shocks to that premium were experienced by essentially all countries
whether or not they had a collapsing housing bubble. Second, he was sur-
prised that the authors were agnostic about whether the Marshall-Lerner
condition holds in the long term for developing countries that generally
are obliged to price their exports to market. Third, he thought the paper
needed a better proxy for indebtedness effects.
Richard Cooper was troubled that the authors’ sample was too small
to allow for some necessary distinctions. He suggested thinking more
aggressively about expanding the list of countries, to include, for exam-
ple, smaller countries like Costa Rica. Given the constraint imposed by
the need for quarterly GDP figures, he wondered whether the list could
be enlarged by looking at industrial production for those countries that
typically report monthly or quarterly industrial production data. From
the estimated relationship between GDP and industrial production for
the countries that have both sets of data, one could then simulate quarterly
GDP data for those that do not.
Cooper also would have liked to see the paper distinguish between the
impact of trade shocks that initially fall on the government—the case for
most oil-exporting countries, as well as Russia and Chile, two of the three
countries examined in the case studies—and that of shocks that initially
fall on the private sector. He agreed with the authors’ position on the
Marshall-Lerner condition. Although von Furstenberg’s point was valid, if
a country has a large external debt denominated in foreign currency, then,
starting from a current account deﬁcit, it is very easy to imagine circum-
stances in which the Marshall-Lerner condition would not be met. Hence,
the authors’ agnosticism is warranted.
Susan Collins agreed with Cooper that there are often situations, espe-
cially in the short run, in which the prerequisites for the Marshall-Lerner
condition are not satisfied. She encouraged the authors to devote more
attention to the extent to which having accumulated reserves helped,
given that their usefulness is currently such a huge issue in the literature
and the policy debate. She also noted that for a variety of reasons it is
important to think about the role of domestic investors. In the paper’s case
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but in different ways. In the older literature on capital ﬂight from devel-
oping countries, before there was a lot of investment by the foreign pri-
vate sector, domestic investors were seen as the main source of net capital
outflows. Not only are domestic investors important, but their role can
differ across countries. Because they know the domestic economy better,
foreign investors may look to their behavior when deciding whether to
enter, stay, or leave.
Kathryn Dominguez agreed with Kristin Forbes that the paper needed
to do more to take initial conditions into account. One way to do this
might be to examine what the model would have expected for the emerg-
ing market countries in the sample when the financial crisis initially hit
the developed countries. In the authors’ regressions, both initial condi-
tions and the crisis show up as significant factors in the results. As a con-
sequence, countries whose initial conditions were poor and made worse
by the crisis are indistinguishable from other countries that were doing
well before the crisis but were hit particularly hard by it. These effects
should be separated out.
Gregory Mankiw agreed with Forbes that the dataset ought to be
expanded to include some developed countries whose income per capita is
comparable to those of the richer emerging markets. Beyond that, he sug-
gested including France, Italy, and some other higher-income countries as
well. The important question is why the developed countries fared differ-
ently in the crisis from emerging market countries, and it seemed natural to
at least make the comparison. Indeed, a future Brookings Paper might take
the methodology one step further and apply it to U.S. states, whose perfor-
mance in the crisis was also heterogeneous.
Alan Blinder noted that both discussants had raised the issue of timing,
as had Dominguez. He thought it would be interesting to know whether the
countries in the authors’ sample had already decoupled before the fourth
quarter of 2008. The paper gave the impression that there was decoupling,
but that it ended with the shock; it would be interesting to see to what
extent there was actually “coupling” before the shock. He also suggested
exploring whether countries’ level of external debt interacted with—and
whether their outcomes differed depending on—the nature of the exchange
rate regime. Finally, it would also be interesting to know whether the for-
eign currency composition of countries’ debt on the eve of the crisis looked
different than it had several years before, and whether countries differed
in this respect. This might show to what extent countries had learned the
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from issuing debt denominated in foreign currencies.
David Romer noted that although the case studies were interesting in
themselves, they lacked a strong link to the rest of the paper. They pro-
vided interesting detail on the mechanism by which the shock was trans-
mitted, and they suggested potentially important variables that had not
been considered previously and for which good measures were lacking.
The case studies might also provide evidence about whether the relation-
ships found in the paper’s regressions reﬂected omitted variables or causal
effects. For example, Latvia is an inﬂuential observation in the short-term
debt analysis, but the case study of that country suggested that its high
short-term debt was really a symptom of an unsustainable boom. If Latvia’s
short-term debt had been lower while everything else remained the same, its
outcome might have been closer to what the regression predicted. To some
extent, short-term debt seemed to be proxying for other things.
Robert Gordon endorsed Richard Cooper’s suggestion of expanding the
sample by using quarterly interpolations for countries that publish only
annual data. He recalled that his own very first paper had used quarterly
data generated using the Chow-Lin method of interpolation, which is still
the best technique available and automatically aligns quarterly estimates
with annual ﬁgures. But any number of methods for interpolating monthly
or quarterly data could be used, and indeed one could use different inter-
polators for different countries.
Valerie Ramey added that in the early postwar period the Economics
and Statistics Administration, the predecessor agency of the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, had published quarterly nominal GDP data going
back to 1939, whereas the currently available data go back only to 1947.
She had come across the earlier data and ﬁgured out how to create deﬂa-
tors to link them with a plausible series of quarterly real GDP. Her results
lined up almost exactly with Gordon’s interpolated quarterly real GDP
series, especially at the important turning points around the beginning of
World War II. If one could successfully do interpolations for the United
States going back that far, it should also be possible for more recent
low-frequency data from other countries, and the sample could probably
be doubled.
Justin Wolfers asked Kristin Forbes whether her discussion implied that
she thought that the paper’s ﬁndings were not very robust. After all, the
authors had rerun the regressions in different ways, testing for robustness
and stability, and the coefﬁcients had rarely moved by more than half of a
standard error. What did change was their statistical signiﬁcance. Forbes
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ing on whether one includes or excludes one or two countries, or whether
one includes or excludes an additional control, but she thought that with the
addition of more countries, the robustness and the results would probably
hold up.
Christopher Sims was skeptical of the short-term debt variable, which
he saw as basically an endogenous variable that may not be that useful.
Both short-term debt and reserves ought to be thought of as endogenous,
and the authors’ case study of Chile showed that what really matters is
the credibility of monetary and fiscal policy. A country with a credible
monetary and ﬁscal regime can borrow if it runs out of reserves; less cred-
ible countries cannot. He read the regression results as showing that the
regression coefﬁcient on the short-term debt variable did fall when Latvia
was taken out of the sample, demonstrating that it was not just the statisti-
cal signiﬁcance that changed.
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